Psychology and financial management: Behavioral corporate finance

Abstract

UvodKorporativne finansije (poslovne finansije ili finansijski menadžment) kao disciplina u okviru savremene finansijske teorije imaju za cilj da objasne stvarne finansijske i investicione odluke koje treba da donesu finansijski menadžeri preduzeća. Pošto su date odluke rezultat interakcije finansijskih menadžera i investitora, za njihovo potpuno razumevanje potrebno je razumeti verovanja i preferencije obeju strana. Moderne ili neoklasične finansije nude normativne principe odlučivanja za racionalne agente -investitore i menadžere. U svetu racionalnosti menadžeri treba da pođu od toga da cene akcija na efikasnim tržištima odražavaju sve javno raspoložive informacije o fundamentalnoj vrednosti preduzeća. Investitori, pak, polaze od toga da menadžeri rade u sopstvenom interesu, racionalno reagujući na podsticaje oblikovane putem kompenzacionih šema, tržišta za korporativnu kontrolu i drugih mehanizama korporativnog upravljanja (Baker, Ruback, Wurgler, 2004a, str. 1.). Da li se stvari menjaju ako imamo u vidu da finansijska trži-šta nisu dovoljno efikasna, niti su menadžeri, baš kao i investitori, potpuno racionalni Homo ekonomikusi, već obični ljudi od krvi i mesa?Bihevioralne korporativne finansije nastoje da, na bazi posmatranja i izučavanja ponašanja investitora i menadžera, sofisticiranim matematičko-statističkim modelima modernih korporativnih finansija dodaju kognitivne psihološke elemente. Istovremeno, one pokušavaju Sažetak U radu su predstavljene bihevioralne korporativne finansije. Za razliku od dominantne teorije modernih korporativnih finansija, bihevioralne korporativne finansije dozvoljavaju mogućnost da investitori ne budu potpuno racionalni. One dozvoljavaju i mogućnost da finansijski menadžeri preduzeća poseduju nestandardne preferencije, pristrasno odlučuju, odnosno da, bar ponekad, budu neracionalni. Sve te neracionalnosti mogu imati značajne implikacije na ciljnu funkciju preduzeća, finansijsku i investicionu politiku preduzeća i na sistem korporativnog upravljanja.Ključne reči: bihevioralne finansije, bihevioralne korporativne fi nansije, finansijska politika, investiciona politika, efikasnost trži šta, maksimiziranje vrednosti preduzeća, korporativno upravljanje. AbstractIn this paper, we present behavioral corporate finance. Unlike the dominant theory of modern corporate finance, behavioral corporate finance allows situations in which investors are not entirely rational. Behavioral corporate finance also allows corporate financial managers to have nonstandard preferences, to make biased decisions, and even, occasionally to be irrational. All those irrationalities might have a significant impact on the corporate objective function, corporate financial and investment policy as well as to system of corporate governance.

Corporate Leverage Transmission Under Information Asymmetry: Evidence From Non-Financial Firms of Pakistan

“…It is one of the main implications of Myers and Majluf (1984) observation that shows how information asymmetry affects firm's financing decisions. It is associated with high transaction cost and information asymmetry cost, managers are resistant to issue equity due to these costs (Todorović, 2011). According to Myers and Mjluf (1984), under asymmetric information between insiders and outsider, firms follow the hierarchical financing while using external financing, prefer to use debt financing as first resort instead of equity financing.…”

“…The results related to pooled and fixed effect model are presented in Table 3 key assumption of Pecking order theory that firm goes for internal financing first and then goes for external financing. As information asymmetry is higher, the financing needs are satisfied by debt issuance (Bharath et al, 2008;Todorović, 2011). Moreover, information asymmetry is associated with higher equity issuance cost and a firm that goes for debt financing is due to low cost of capital (He et al, 2013;Gao and Zhu, 2015).…”

“…Therefore, firm prefers the debt issuance in place of equity issuance and causes an increase in leverage (Fama and French, 2005). According to Todorović (2011), managers show resistance for issuance of equity because of transaction costs and high information asymmetry and the result is high cost of capital.…”

Тестирање Релевантности Алтернативних Теорија Структуре Капитала У Привреди Србије

“…The pecking order theory was developed by observing the companies' preferences in the selection of financial sources (Myers, 1984;Myers & Majluf, 1984). According to this theory, mangers are reluctant to issue equity due to the high information asymmetry and transaction costs (Todorović, 2011). Actually, under the conditions of asymmetric information (managers have more information than investors), investors monitor signals of the managerial activities.…”

The role of financial management in the company

“…On the other hand, rational theory seeks that managers should start by saying that stock prices in efficient markets reflect all publicly available information about the fundamental value of a business. Investors, on the other hand, assume that managers act in their own interest, rationally responding to incentives shaped through corporate governance mechanisms [2].…”