PUF-Based Node Mutual Authentication Scheme for Delay Tolerant Mobile Sensor Network

Yang, Kuiwu; Zheng, Kan; Guo, Yuanbo; Wei, Dawei

doi:10.1109/wicom.2011.6040366

Cited by 10 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…PUFs are also used in the symmetric-key authentication protocol proposed by [12]. Finally, PUFs are applied to authentication of mobile sensor network nodes in [41]. The idea is to prevent an array of attacks which are possible when physical access to a node is possible.…”

Section: Signature Generationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Design and evaluation of a delay-based FPGA Physically Unclonable Function

Mills

Vyas

Patterson

et al. 2012

2012 IEEE 30th International Conference on Computer Design (ICCD)

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Section: Signature Generationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Design and evaluation of a delay-based FPGA Physically Unclonable Function

Mills

Vyas

Patterson

et al. 2012

2012 IEEE 30th International Conference on Computer Design (ICCD)

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“…TSS [116,117], PNMA [120], SE-PUF [122], HSTRS [116], and RAPD [123] where PUF outputs were used to authenticate the network nodes, and sometimes additional formation was added to the PUF output to help in the authentication process such as the node location.…”

Section: Managing Wrong Responses With Agingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Liu , et al [64] used PUF based on a double‐data‐rate in DDR3 memory for key generating in WSN (PDKGW). Yang , et al [120] built a PUF‐based node mutual authentication (PNMA) scheme for delay‐tolerant mobile sensor networks (DTMSNs), which are similar to WSN. Danev , et al also used PUF as physical‐layer identification of wireless devices (PLIWDs) [121].…”

Section: Applications Of Pufmentioning

confidence: 99%

Physical unclonable function: architectures, applications and challenges for dependable security

Ning

Farha

Ullah

et al. 2020

IET Circuits, Devices & Systems

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Physical unclonable function (PUF) is hardware-specific security primitive for providing cryptographic functionalities that are applicable for secure communication among the embedded devices. The physical structure of PUF is considered to be easy to manufacture but hard or impossible to replicate due to variations in its manufacturing process. However, a large community of analytics believes hardware-based PUF has paved the way for its realisation in providing dependable security. In this study, the authors have thoroughly explored the architecture, applications, requirements, and challenges of PUF that provide security solutions. For presenting the literature, they have designed a taxonomy where PUFs are divided under two main categories, including non-silicon and silicon-based PUF. Currently, there is no comprehensive survey that highlights the comparison and usability of memory-based and analogue/mixed-signal based PUF that are considered to be suitable as compared to counterparts. In a similar vein, they have presented the network-specific application scenarios in wireless sensor network, wireless body area network and Internet of Things and then identified the strong, weak and controlled PUF in a categorical manner. Moreover, they have presented a number of prospective limitations that are identified in PUF structures and then identified the open research challenges to meet the desired security levels.

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“…They also proposed a destructive private authentication protocol for RFID systems. Furthermore, recently, several new authentication mechanisms based on PUF functions have been proposed in order to enhance their security and privacy levels .…”

Section: Preliminariesmentioning

confidence: 99%

k‐strong privacy for radio frequency identification authentication protocols based on physically unclonable functions

Kardaş

Celi̇k

Bingöl

et al. 2014

Wireless Communications

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This paper examines Vaudenay's privacy model, which is one of the first and most complete privacy models that featured the notion of different privacy classes. We enhance this model by introducing two new generic adversary classes, k‐strong and k‐forward adversaries where the adversary is allowed to corrupt a tag at most k times. Moreover, we introduce an extended privacy definition that also covers all privacy classes of Vaudenay's model. In order to achieve highest privacy level, we study low cost primitives such as physically unclonable functions (PUFs). The common assumption of PUFs is that their physical structure is destroyed once tampered. This is an ideal assumption because the tamper resistance depends on the ability of the attacker and the quality of the PUF circuits. In this paper, we have weakened this assumption by introducing a new definition k‐resistant PUFs. k‐PUFs are tamper resistant against at most k attacks; that is, their physical structure remains still functional and correct until at most kth physical attack. Furthermore, we prove that strong privacy can be achieved without public‐key cryptography using k PUF‐based authentication. We finally prove that our extended proposal achieves both reader authentication and k‐strong privacy. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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PUF-Based Node Mutual Authentication Scheme for Delay Tolerant Mobile Sensor Network

Cited by 10 publications

References 17 publications

Design and evaluation of a delay-based FPGA Physically Unclonable Function

Design and evaluation of a delay-based FPGA Physically Unclonable Function

Physical unclonable function: architectures, applications and challenges for dependable security

k‐strong privacy for radio frequency identification authentication protocols based on physically unclonable functions

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