Qualia and Analytical Conditionals

Braddon‐Mitchell, David

doi:10.5840/jphil2003100321

Cited by 73 publications

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confidence: 94%

A Priori Conditionals and the Conceivability of Zombies

Majeed

2014

Philosophical Papers

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Abstract:The conditional analysis of phenomenal concepts, as proposed independently by Hawthorne (2002), Stalnaker (2002 and Braddon-Mitchell (2003), is used to undermine Chalmers's (1996) conceivability argument in a way that is compatible with our having the zombie intuition. The aim of this paper is twofold: (1) To remove current misconceptions concerning how the analysis is to be applied. It will be explained how there are two distinct ways the analysis can be used to undermine the conceivability argument. (2) To employ this exposition to defend the analysis from objections leveled against it by Chalmers (2005) and Alter (2007).

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confidence: 94%

A Priori Conditionals and the Conceivability of Zombies

Majeed

2014

Philosophical Papers

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“…This is because, if we think of words as individuated in such a fine-grained way, we can still think of doing analysis on the concepts that these words express even if we cannot use the same word to express different concepts. 5 This point is underscored in David Braddon-Mitchell's way of developing Jackson's basic understanding of conceptual analysis in (Braddon-Mitchell 2003). 6 I use the term ''predicate-type'' concept here to signal that Jackson's theory is aimed at concepts such as those expressed by the terms ''dog'' and ''chair'' and not at such things as logical or modal operators.…”

Section: Jackson's Theory Of Conceptual Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As I see it, Jackson's theory of concepts is important chiefly because it is one of most sophisticated and systematic attempts to articulate an understanding of concepts that is widely accepted in large parts of philosophical practice. In some cases, this acceptance is relatively explicit-e.g., by philosophers such as David Chalmers, Phillip Pettit, David Braddon-Mitchell, and Michael Smith (Chalmers 1996;Pettit 2003;Braddon-Mitchell 2003;Smith 2004). In other cases, the theory of conceptual analysis is largely presupposed but not formally endorsed-e.g., in areas ranging from philosophy of mind to philosophy of law to formal semantics.…”

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confidence: 99%

Expressivism, representation, and the nature of conceptual analysis

Plunkett¹

2010

Philos Stud

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Philosophers often hold that the aim of conceptual analysis is to discover the representational content of a given concept such as FREE WILL, BELIEF, or LAW. In From Metaphysics to Ethics and other recent work, Frank Jackson has developed a theory of conceptual analysis that is one of the most advanced systematizations of this widespread idea. I argue that this influential way of characterizing conceptual analysis is too narrow. I argue that it is possible that an expressivist account could turn out to be correct as a genuine conceptual analysis of a genuine concept. I claim that since an expressivist analysis does not aim to discover the representational content of a given concept-and, indeed, might itself be based on the idea that the concept in question is not even representational in nature-the possibility of expressivist conceptual analysis shows that Jackson's theory of conceptual analysis is incomplete as it currently stands. I conclude that Jackson needs to either shift his basic understanding of the nature of conceptual analysis or commit to a particular normative reinterpretation of his project.

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“…Intuitively, they seem conceivable, and many take this to support their metaphysical possibility -a result that, most agree, would refute physicalism. John Hawthorne (2002) [Philosophical Studies 109, 17-52] and David Braddon-Mitchell (2003) [The Journal of Philosophy 100, have developed a novel response to this argument: phenomenal concepts have a conditional structure -they refer to non-physical states if such states exist and otherwise to physical states -and this explains the zombie intuition. I argue that this strategy fails.…”

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On the Conditional Analysis of Phenomenal Concepts

Alter

2006

Philos Stud

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ABSTRACT. Zombies make trouble for physicalism. Intuitively, they seem conceivable, and many take this to support their metaphysical possibility -a result that, most agree, would refute physicalism. John Hawthorne (2002) [Philosophical Studies 109, 17-52] and David Braddon-Mitchell (2003) [The Journal of Philosophy 100, have developed a novel response to this argument: phenomenal concepts have a conditional structure -they refer to non-physical states if such states exist and otherwise to physical states -and this explains the zombie intuition. I argue that this strategy fails. The considerations Hawthorne and Braddon-Mitchell adduce in support of their analysis in fact do no such thing. Further, their main argument for the analysis is self-defeating: exactly similar reasoning would undermine the view it is meant to establish. Finally, on closer inspection the conditional analysis is incompatible with the zombie intuition. Thus, not only is the analysis incapable of explaining the intuition: the intuition's plausibility indicates that the analysis is incorrect. I also suggest that the allure of the conditional-analysis strategy may derive from a questionable view about what explaining the intuition would require.Zombies make trouble for physicalism. They are defined as creatures that lack consciousness but are physically and functionally identical to conscious human beings: there is nothing it is like to be a zombie.1 Intuitively, such creatures are conceivable, and their conceivability is often taken to support the claim that they are metaphysically possible. But if they are metaphysically possible, then -most agree -physicalism is false.

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Qualia and Analytical Conditionals

Cited by 73 publications

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A Priori Conditionals and the Conceivability of Zombies

A Priori Conditionals and the Conceivability of Zombies

Expressivism, representation, and the nature of conceptual analysis

On the Conditional Analysis of Phenomenal Concepts

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