“…Third, ex post information asymmetry may arise where transactions are complex and their outcomes are causally ambiguous (Chi, 1994;Lippman & Rumelt, 1982), so that it may be hard to tell, even ex post, whether the observed outcome was the result of deliberate action (or inaction) on the part of the transaction partner. Finally, ex post information asymmetry may also result from challenges in measuring transaction outcomes (Besley & Ghatak, 2005;Chi, 1994;Hwang & Powell, 2009), for instance, where the outcomes of a transaction are imperfectly measured so that there is a gap between perfunctory performance and consummate performance, leaving room for quality-shading (Hart, 2003(Hart, , 2008Hart & Moore, 2008) and moral hazard (Chi, 1994;Hölmstrom, 1979;Luo, Kaul, & Seo, 2018); where the benefits to the recipient are complex (Hölmstrom & Milgrom, 1991) or subjective (Waguespack & Salomon, 2015); or where measurement is costly, making comprehensive assessment infeasible . In all these cases, ex post information asymmetry impairs the functioning of markets, making it challenging for transacting parties to correctly assess the value of transactions (Anheier & Ben-Ner, 1997;Hansmann, 1980), and causing skeptical actors to choose not to transact, while naïve actors receive less than they pay for.…”