R&D Cooperation and Spillovers: Some Empirical Evidence from Belgium

Abstract

This paper provides some first empirical evidence on the relationship between R&D spillovers and R&D cooperation. The results suggest disentangling different aspects of know-how flows. Firms which rate incoming spillovers more importantly and who can limit outgoing spillovers by a more effective protection of know-how, are more likely to cooperate in R&D. Our analysis also finds that cooperating firms have higher incoming spillovers and higher protection of know-how, indicating that cooperation may serve as a vehicle to manage information flows. Our results thus suggest that on the one hand the information sharing and coordination aspects of incoming spillovers are crucial in understanding cooperation, while on the other hand, protection against outgoing spillovers is important for firms to engage in stable cooperative agreements by reducing free-rider problems. Distinguishing different types of cooperative partners reveals that while managing outgoing spillovers is less critical in alliances with non-commercial research partners than between vertically related partners, the incoming spillovers seem to be more critical in understanding the former type of R&D cooperation.

The ‘new firm paradigm’ and the provision of training: The impact of ICT, workplace organization and human capital

“…This instrument is a 3-digit industry average 7 of a variable that measures whether the variation of the wage level within a firm primarily depends on the individual performance of the employees. In line with Cassiman and Veugelers (2002), we assume that this industry variable picks-up the effect of unobserved industry-specific attributes that contribute to the potential endogenous firm-specific variables (see Cassiman andVeugelers, 2002, p. 1174). Accordingly, it can be assumed that the instrument is uncorrelated with the error term.…”

“…All instruments in these equations fulfill the required conditions: they are correlated with the dependent variable in the instrument equation but uncorrelated with the dependent variable in the structural equation (training equation) and they are not correlated with the residuals of the endogenized training equation (for details of measurement see Table 1). In line with Cassiman and Veugelers (2002), we assume that each of these industry variables picks-up the effect of unobserved industry-specific attributes that contribute to the potential endogenous firm-specific variables (see Cassiman andVeugelers, 2002, p. 1174). In a second stage, we include the residuals of the first stage in our training equation.…”

Using Innovation Surveys for Econometric Analysis

“…Both studies emphasize the importance of cost and risk sharing in determining R&D cooperation. Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) report that incoming spillovers increase cooperation with universities, but not with suppliers and customers, and that on the contrary appropriability influences vertical collaboration but not collaboration with nonindustrial partners. These results are confirmed by Leiponen (2002), who concludes that innovation and R&D cooperation depend on the technological regime: low appropriability discourages collaboration with suppliers, demand pull increases the probability of collaborating with customers, supply-dominated firms are less likely to innovate and collaborate, and sciencebased regimes are associated with R&D, innovation and collaboration with universities.…”

Simultaneous Allocation of Bundled Goods through Auctions: Assessing the Case for Joint Bidding

“…Allowing joint bidding increases efficiency by 11.3% and revenue by 9.4%. We also observe that when joint bidding is not allowed, 3 Part of the literature on the formation of joint ventures raises similar concerns regarding their net effect on efficiency (d 'Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988;Farrell andShapiro 1990 andKamien, Muller andZang, 1992), with little evidence to reach a broad conclusion (Cassiman and Veugelers 2002;Gugler andSiebert 2007 andDuso, Roeller andSeldeslachts, 2014;Suetens, 2005 and. some of the groups were able to form bidding rings and were partially successful at implementing collusive agreements (as detected by low sham bids).…”