Radionuclide identification algorithm for organic scintillator-based radiation portal monitor

Paff, Marc; Fulvio, Angela Di; Clarke, Shaun D.; Pozzi, Sara A.

doi:10.1016/j.nima.2017.01.009

Cited by 21 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…Over the past years, our group has developed several radionuclide identification algorithms for EJ-309-based portal monitors 6,8,12 . This work proposes a novel computational Bayesian method for source identification that we have applied to both liquid EJ-309 and solid-state trans-stilbene scintillators.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Here, we are interested in finding the coefficients associated with a set of nuclides. Numerous strategies have been proposed to solve this problem and, before introducing the proposed method, we first discuss the two methods used in 12 and gathered in the…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Using a product of independent exponential prior distributions for x, leads to a model that is based on an  1 -norm penalty. This is the model used in our preliminary work 12 . In that work, we compared two approaches, namely, MAP estimation and MMSE estimation, leading to two algorithms, MAP L1 and MMSE L1 , respectively.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Bayesian approaches to detect, classify, and estimate smuggled nuclear and radiological materials are not a new consideration 6,12 , and were extensively studied for the development of the Statistical Radiation Detection System at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. This group has used Bayesian model-based sequential statistical processing techniques to overcome the low signal-to-background ratio that complicates traditional gamma spectroscopy techniques with high-resolution HPGe and inorganic scintillation detectors 13,14 .…”

Section: Algorithms For Rpm Signal Unmixingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Medical isotopes are another growing source of nuisance alarms. A patient may emit sufficient gamma radiation for days or even weeks after a procedure to set off an RPM gamma alarm [4][5][6][7] , depending on the nuclear medicine isotope used and its administered activity.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Expectation-propagation for weak radionuclide identification at radiation portal monitors

Altmann

Fulvio

Paff

et al. 2020

Sci Rep

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We propose a sparsity-promoting Bayesian algorithm capable of identifying radionuclide signatures from weak sources in the presence of a high radiation background. the proposed method is relevant to radiation identification for security applications. In such scenarios, the background typically consists of terrestrial, cosmic, and cosmogenic radiation that may cause false positive responses. We evaluate the new Bayesian approach using gamma-ray data and are able to identify weapons-grade plutonium, masked by naturally-occurring radioactive material (noRM), in a measurement time of a few seconds. We demonstrate this identification capability using organic scintillators (stilbene crystals and EJ-309 liquid scintillators), which do not provide direct, high-resolution, source spectroscopic information. Compared to the EJ-309 detector, the stilbene-based detector exhibits a lower identification error, on average, owing to its better energy resolution. organic scintillators are used within radiation portal monitors to detect gamma rays emitted from conveyances crossing ports of entry. the described method is therefore applicable to radiation portal monitors deployed in the field and could improve their threat discrimination capability by minimizing "nuisance" alarms produced either by noRMbearing materials found in shipped cargoes, such as ceramics and fertilizers, or radionuclides in recently treated nuclear medicine patients.The growing terrorism threat based on the use of special nuclear materials (SNMs), i.e., highly enriched uranium (HEU), weapons-grade plutonium (WGPu), or high-activity radiological sources has reinforced the need for improved population protection mechanisms. Nuclear security aims to deter and detect the smuggling of these materials across state borders. One major defense mechanism involves the installation of radiation portal monitors (RPMs) at border crossings. These RPMs typically consist of 3 He proportional counters embedded in polyethylene for neutron detection, and slabs of polyvinyl-toluene (PVT) scintillators for gamma-ray detection. Only a tiny fraction of the millions of vehicles and cargo containers entering a country like the United States are likely to be carrying radiological contraband. The International Atomic Energy Agency's Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) merely counts a few dozen reported successful interdictions of nuclear and radiological materials globally per year 1,2 . The ITDB provides only a partial picture of the number of smuggling attempts. The reported figures should be considered a lower bound of the number of successful interdictions, because they include only successful interdictions, voluntarily reported by the member states.Complicating matters, the radiological contraband might be well shielded. In 2017, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development estimated the global container port throughput at over 750 million 20-foot equivalent units 3 . As a consequence, RPMs are limited in measurement time to minimize unnecessary impediments to the fl...

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%