2007
DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2006.12.001
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Rare events and annuity market participation

Abstract: We investigate whether a rare event (like the default of the annuity provider) can explain the annuity market participation puzzle. High risk aversion is needed to change behavior in the presence of such a disastrous shock but higher risk aversion also makes annuities more valuable. Therefore, these rare events are unlikely candidates to explain the low take-up of voluntary annuities.JEL Classification: E21, H00.

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Cited by 25 publications
(18 citation statements)
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“…62 Our results are reported in Table 18, where we set management fees and intentional bequests to zero. Previous models without correlated risks indicate that default risk has very little impact on annuitization (see, for example, the careful analysis by Lopes and Michaelides, 2007). Table 18 verifies that result by showing that counterparty risk affects annuitization only marginally in the Yaari version of our model without correlated risk.…”
Section: Bequest Motivessupporting
confidence: 74%
“…62 Our results are reported in Table 18, where we set management fees and intentional bequests to zero. Previous models without correlated risks indicate that default risk has very little impact on annuitization (see, for example, the careful analysis by Lopes and Michaelides, 2007). Table 18 verifies that result by showing that counterparty risk affects annuitization only marginally in the Yaari version of our model without correlated risk.…”
Section: Bequest Motivessupporting
confidence: 74%
“…10 See Lopes (2006). 11 Lopes and Michaelides (2007) argue that the possibility of a "rare event"like the default of the annuity provider cannot by itself explain the puzzle since such a rare event would change behavior for high risk aversion coe¢ cients but a high risk aversion simultaneously makes annuity demand stronger.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“… unfair pricing due to adverse selection and transaction costs (Friedman and Warshawsky, 1988; Mitchell et al, 1999); constant annuity payouts in combination with borrowing and short‐selling constraints may induce a suboptimal consumption profile (Brown, 2001; Gupta and Li, 2007); the existence of bequest motives (Yaari, 1965); the crowding‐out effect of government pensions (Mitchell et al, 1999; Brown and Poterba, 2000); intrafamily risk sharing (Kotlikoff and Spivak, 1981; Post, Gründl, and Schmeiser, 2006); default‐risk of the annuity providing insurer (Babbel and Merrill, 2006; Lopes and Michaelides, 2007; Huang, Tsai, and Tzeng, 2008); substitution of annuities by long‐term care insurance (Davidoff, 2008); and behavioral biases, like framing (Agnew et al, 2008; Brown et al, 2008). …”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…default‐risk of the annuity providing insurer (Babbel and Merrill, 2006; Lopes and Michaelides, 2007; Huang, Tsai, and Tzeng, 2008);…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%