Reason and Conversion in Kierkegaard and the German Idealists

Kemp, Ryan; Iacovetti, Christopher

doi:10.4324/9781351182287

Cited by 7 publications

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“…30 Loncar (2013, 365-66) explores this possibility. See also Kosch (2006) and Kemp and Iacovetti (2020), who argue (in different ways) that problems that emerge in Kant's account of radical evil are formative for the development of German Idealism and the emergence of Kierkegaardian existentialism.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Reflective Judgment and Radical Evil in Kant’sReligion

Stoner¹,

Wilford²

2021

The Southern J of Philosophy

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This article argues that, on Kant’s account, the claim that an individual is radically evil depends on a reflective judgment that treats all the choices this individual makes as if they were determined by a single supreme maxim. Subsequently, it shows that Kant’s proof of the universality of radical evil is a transcendental argument, which establishes that the human experience of moral life as a constant struggle is only possible for a person whose choices are determined by a single supreme maxim if that person’s supreme maxim is evil. It concludes that the concept of radical evil is a regulative principle, which explains how radical evil is consistent with human freedom.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Reflective Judgment and Radical Evil in Kant’sReligion

Stoner¹,

Wilford²

2021

The Southern J of Philosophy

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“…76 Schelling SW I/1: 301, 304-5. 77 Kemp and Iacovetti (2020) object to my pluralist reading of Schelling in Bruno (2014), Bruno (2016), and Bruno (2020a). I rebut their objection in Bruno (2022b).…”

Section: The Kind Of Philosophy One Inheritsmentioning

confidence: 97%

Post-Kantian Idealism and Self-Transformation

Bruno

2023

Transformation and the History of Philosophy

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What makes Immanuel Kant's Copernican revolution Copernican and what makes it a revolution?The B-Preface to the Critique of Pure Reason (1781Reason ( , 1787 proposes an "experiment" that "promises to metaphysics the secure course of a science", viz., to assume, not that "all our cognition must conform to the objects", which is an assumption that "[u]p to now" has "come to nothing", but rather that "objects must conform to our cognition". Kant compares this assumption to "the first thoughts of Copernicus". Just as Copernicus discovers a shift in the nature of celestial bodies on the basis of a "hypothesis" about the orbital activity of the earth, so too Kant discovers a shift in the nature of natural bodies on the basis of an "analogous" hypothesis about the cognitive activity of the subject. Insofar as the subject contributes to cognition both the "representations of space and time" and "the elementary concepts of the understanding", the object must "agree" with these representational elements and so must be cognizable, not as "a thing in itself ", but rather as "an appearance". 1 Kant's Copernican revolution is Copernican, then, because it turns from prioritizing the status of the object toward prioritizing the activity of the subject.The B-Preface also cites Copernicus' theory as a "remarkable" example of sciences that "have become what they are now through a revolution brought about all at once". Kant clarifies that the analogous revolution that he proposes for "the accepted procedure of metaphysics" is firstpersonal, since it amounts to a "transformation in our way of thinking" whereby the idea that "cognition reaches only appearances" serves as a "crosscheck" for our explanation of the possibility of cognition. 2 This change of mind is not unlike what, in Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (1793), Kant calls a "change of heart", viz., the "transformation" of our moral disposition whereby, through a "revolution" as opposed to a "gradual reform", the "representation of duty" alone becomes our incentive to act. 3 Such a change of heart results from judging, exclusively on the basis of consciousness of the moral law, that "[one] can do something because [one] is aware that [one] ought to do it and cognizes freedom within [oneself ]", as Kant explains in the Critique of Practical Reason (1788). 4 Moreover, a change of mind and a change of heart must be two aspects of one and the same revolution, given that, as Kant says in Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785), a "complete critique of reason" must transform our reason in both its theoretical and its practical uses. 5 Kant's Copernican revolution is a revolution, then, because it demands a transformation of oneself.

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“…18 18 See, for instance, Allison (2011, pp. 78–79), Kemp (2019, p. 6), and Kemp and Iacovetti (2020, Ch. 1). …”

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Rereading Kant on immortality and the highest good

Morgan

2021

European J of Philosophy

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Kant's argument for belief in the immortality of the soul appears tenuous. The standard interpretation suggests that immortality is necessary because agents need an endless time in order to become holy (i.e., incapable of deviation from the moral law). Yet Kant elsewhere argues that sensible beings cannot be holy. This interpretation thus cannot make sense of Kant's insistence that agents become holy, supposing instead that this is an error on Kant's part.Against this reading, I argue that progress toward holiness is simply a definition of virtue, and that Kant's reference to it does not contradict itself by implying that sensible beings must become holy at some point in time. Drawing on Kant's account of the Gesinnung in the Religion, I then proceed to offer a novel reading as to why immortality is needed to secure the complete conformity of a disposition with the moral law. Even Kant's staunchest defenders admit that the second Critique's argument for the immortality of the soul appears tenuous. There, Kant argues that we need to believe in immortality in order to secure the coherency of reason in promoting the highest good, which he defines as the synthetic connection between virtue and happiness. While the postulate for God's existence aims to secure happiness, immortality is supposed to secure virtue. In brief, Kant's argument for the latter runs as follows: our duty is to be morally perfect, and since "ought" implies "can", we must be able to be morally perfect. But in order to achieve that state of moral perfection, the soul must be immortal. Why, exactly, remains a matter of debate, but most interpreters have thought that since this task is so difficult, we will need a lot of time (and hence immortality) to achieve it. 1 Despite the apparent philosophical implausibility of this thesis, it nevertheless remains the dominant interpretation.Although Kant himself clearly thought the postulate of immortality was central to the critical project (it makes an appearance in all three Critiques), most interpreters have disagreed. Kant's argument, they claim, is unpersuasive at best, question begging at worst. To name just one of the problems these commentators raise: Kant seems to, without forewarning or justification, introduce the concept of holiness (Heiligkeit). In contrast to a merely virtuous will, it is

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Reason and Conversion in Kierkegaard and the German Idealists

Cited by 7 publications

References 0 publications

Reflective Judgment and Radical Evil in Kant’sReligion

Reflective Judgment and Radical Evil in Kant’sReligion

Post-Kantian Idealism and Self-Transformation

Rereading Kant on immortality and the highest good

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