Reasoning in Young Children: Fantasy and Information Retrieval

Abstract

The present article examines 2 predictions concerning conditional reasoning in children derived from Markovits's model of conditional reasoning. The first claims that children under 12 years of age should be able to respond correctly to uncertain logical forms if the premises and context enable them to access pertinent counterexamples from memory. The second concerns the effect of reasoning in a fantasy context. Previous studies have established that young children can correctly respond to certain reasoning problems with empirically false premises when these are presented in a fantasy context. However, this model of reasoning predicts that presenting empirically true premises in a fantasy context should decrease performance on the 2 uncertain logical forms. In Study 1, a total of 48 8‐year‐olds, 78 10‐year‐olds, and 74 12‐year‐olds were given 4 reasoning problems involving familiar premises. These problems were embedded in either a fantasy or a realistic context and presented via video tape. Results were consistent with the predictions made. Study 2 attempted to determine whether these results could be due to context or problem formulation. A total of 40 7‐year‐olds and 46 8‐year‐olds were given reasoning problems with either no context or with a visual image preceding the problems. Results showed that children did equally well in these conditions, and that providing an image did not improve performance.

Age Differences in the Relationship Among Conditional Inference, Working Memory and Prepotent Response Inhibition

“…Previous research has yielded similar results for each logical form (e.g. Ishida, 1980;Markovits, 1995;Markovits, Fleury, Quinn, & Venet, 1998;Markovits, Venet, Janveau-Brennan, Malfait, Pion, & Vadeboncoeur, 1996). The present study validates the findings of previous studies by directly comparing the inference performance of different age groups in a single study, using the same tasks.…”

“…Byrnes & Overton, 1986;Ishida, 1980) or by using conditional propositions that readily produce other possibilities (e.g. Markovits et al, 1998;Markovits et al, 1996). These results suggested that even preschoolers and elementary students had the ability to infer conclusions from the invalid forms.…”

The case for a dual-process theory of transitive reasoning

“…Finally here, Crone et al concluded that the evidence that activation in RLPFC associated with relational integration increases as a function of age suggests that development of the RLPFC integration mechanism occurs over the age range (8-12 years). This is the same age range as identified as critical to the initial emergence of transitivity as a deductive competence and also many other domains of deductive reasoning (Bouwmeester & Sijtsma, 2007;Chapell & Overton, 2002;De Neys & Vanderputte, 2011;Markovits et al, 1996;Markovits & Thompson, 2008;Morsanyi & Handley, 2008;Verweij et al, 1996;Wright, 1998a, b).…”

“…For example, Markovits et al (1996) investigated conditional reasoning in 7 to 12 year-olds. The tasks were framed using pretend contexts, such as the likes and dislikes of people on a pretend planet.…”

The Development of Counterfactual Reasoning in Belief Revision

“…This is not because children do not reason according to the dictates of Mental Models. Children as young as those in the present study show a pattern of logical inference similar to adults (Markovits, Venet, Janveau-Brennan, Malfait, Pion, & Vadeboncoeur, 1996): they are accurate on Modus Ponens arguments and make errors on Modus Tollens arguments. If their performance in the present study were the result of such logical operations, they would not show the same pattern of reasoning (e.g., a logic/structure effect) as do the adults in the study.…”