The present article examines 2 predictions concerning conditional reasoning in children derived from a revised version of Markovits's model of conditional reasoning. The first study examined the prediction that younger children (8 years of age) would have greater difficulty in responding correctly to premises where the antecedent was strongly associated with the consequent than to premises where the association was weaker; for example, "If something is a car, then it has a motor" should be more difficult than "If something is a refrigerator, then it has a motor." A total of 55 children in grades 2 and 3 (average age: 8 years) and 49 children in grades 5 and 6 (average age: 11 years) were given either 2 strongly associated problems or weakly associated counterparts. Results indicated that 8-year-olds did better on the weakly associated problems than on the strongly associated problems, but there was no difference among the 11-year-olds. The second study examined the prediction that younger children (8 years of age) would have greater difficulty in responding correctly to causal premises ("If a rock is thrown at a window, the window will break") than to corresponding ad hoc premises ("A rock is something that can be used to break a window"). A total of 53 children in grades 2 and 3 (average age: 8 years) and 49 children in grades 5 and 6 (average age: 11 years) were given either 2 causal problems or ad hoc counterparts. Results indicated that 8-year-old did better on the ad hoc problems than on the causal problems, but there was no difference among the 11-year-olds. These studies are interpreted as consistent with the idea that 1 major factor in the development of reasoning in this age level is the development of children's ability to explore their own knowledge base.

The present article examines 2 predictions concerning conditional reasoning in children derived from Markovits's model of conditional reasoning. The first claims that children under 12 years of age should be able to respond correctly to uncertain logical forms if the premises and context enable them to access pertinent counterexamples from memory. The second concerns the effect of reasoning in a fantasy context. Previous studies have established that young children can correctly respond to certain reasoning problems with empirically false premises when these are presented in a fantasy context. However, this model of reasoning predicts that presenting empirically true premises in a fantasy context should decrease performance on the 2 uncertain logical forms. In Study 1, a total of 48 8‐year‐olds, 78 10‐year‐olds, and 74 12‐year‐olds were given 4 reasoning problems involving familiar premises. These problems were embedded in either a fantasy or a realistic context and presented via video tape. Results were consistent with the predictions made. Study 2 attempted to determine whether these results could be due to context or problem formulation. A total of 40 7‐year‐olds and 46 8‐year‐olds were given reasoning problems with either no context or with a visual image preceding the problems. Results showed that children did equally well in these conditions, and that providing an image did not improve performance.

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Recent research on literacy has highlighted the impact of affective factors on learning to read. Among these factors, attitudes toward reading have been clearly shown to influence the development of reading skills and academic success. Nevertheless, differences in children’s attitudes across schooling have yet to be properly documented, especially for the French language and the transition between elementary and secondary education. In this cross-sectional study, our goal was to gauge the attitudes of French-speaking pupils across this transitional period. We therefore administered a computer-based questionnaire to 469 pupils in Grades 5 to 8 in Quebec (Canada), to gather their views about leisure reading and academic reading. Results showed that their stated attitudes toward reading remained stable across the final 2 years of elementary school, as well as across the first 2 years of middle school, but differences were observed for the transition from one education level to the next, with stated attitudes toward reading being less positive in the latter. This effect, which was observed for both leisure and academic reading, concerned girls and boys alike. We discuss possible explanations for these differences in reading attitudes at this juncture in children’s schooling.

The present article examines 2 predictions concerning conditional reasoning in children derived from Markovits's model of conditional reasoning. The first claims that children under 12 years of age should be able to respond correctly to uncertain logical forms if the premises and context enable them to access pertinent counterexamples from memory. The second concems the efFect of reasoning in a fantasy context. Previous studies have established that young children can correctly respond to certain reasoning problems with empirically false premises when these are presented in a fantasy context. However, this model of reasoning predicts that presenting empirically true premises in a fantasy context should decrease perfonnance on the 2 uncertain logical forms. In Study 1, a total of 48 8-year-olds, 78 10-year-olds, and 74 12-year-olds were given 4 reasoning problems involving familiar premises. These problems were embedded in either a fantasy or a realistic context and presented via video tape. Results were consistent with the predictions made. Study 2 attempted to determine whether these results could be due to context or problem formulation. A total of 40 7-year-olds and 46 8-year-olds were given reasoning problems with either no context or with a visual image preceding the problems. Results showed that children did equally well in these conditions, and that providing an image did not improve performance.Condibonal reasoning is one of the cor-ined). Modus ponens is tbe logical principle nerstones of logical reasoning and bas been that involves reasoning witb tbe premises "P the subject of several theories and many ex-implies Q, P is true" and leads to the logiperiments, many of which contradict eaich cally correct conclusion "Q is true." Modus other in one way or anotber. The present tollens involves reasoning with the premises study examines two questions conceming "P implies Q, Q is false" and leads to tbe reasoning in young children. The first of logically correct conclusion "P is false." these concems the ability of children to rea-These two are valid logical forms, since tbey son well with propositions that do not refer both lead to a single, logically correct conto events or objects directly present, while elusion. Affirmation of the consequent inthe second concerns the effects of receiving volves reasoning with the premises "P impropositions in a fantasy context. plies Q, Q is true." Denial of tbe antecedent Conditional reasoning involves reason-i^olves reasoning widi the premises "P iming on the basis of some given "if-then" rela-f'%'