Reasons for Belief and Normativity

Glüer, Kathrin; Wikforss, Åsa

doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199657889.013.26

Cited by 31 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…This is why these arguments do not conclusively show that anti‐normativism is false. What I take these arguments to show, however, is that far from being “unsupported” (Glüer and Wikforss 2018, 576), normativism's status as the default view about epistemic reasons is in fact well‐deserved. We need compelling reasons for rejecting the excellent explanation that normativism provides for the various analogies between normative practical reasons and epistemic reasons (as well as other right‐kind reasons for attitudes).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…Together with Woods, he defends a similar view about epistemic reasons, according to which “only practical reasons are authoritative reasons” (Maguire and Woods 2020, 229). In a recent discussion of the normativity of reasons for belief, Glüer and Wikforss conclude that the “widely endorsed [view] that epistemic reasons are essentially normative” (2018, 598) is “not supported” (576).…”

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confidence: 99%

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Are epistemic reasons normative?

Kiesewetter

2021

Nous

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According to a widely held view, epistemic reasons are normative reasons for belief -much like prudential or moral reasons are normative reasons for action. In recent years, however, an increasing number of authors have questioned the normativity of epistemic reasons.In this article, I discuss an important challenge for anti-normativism about epistemic reasons and present a series of arguments in support of normativism. The challenge for anti-normativism is to say what kind of reasons epistemic reasons are if they are not normative reasons. I discuss various answers to this challenge and find them all wanting. The arguments for normativism each stress a certain analogy between epistemic reasons and normative reasons for action. Just like normative reasons for action, epistemic reasons provide partial justification; they provide premises for correct reasoning; they constitute good bases for the responses they are reasons for; and they are reasons for which agents can show these responses without committing a mistake. In each case, I argue that the relevant condition is plausibly sufficient for the normativity of a reason, and that normativism is in any case in a much better position to explain the analogy than anti-normativism.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 98%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Are epistemic reasons normative?

Kiesewetter

2021

Nous

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“…8 The present suggestion is neutral on the question of whether one's evidence/reasons are propositionally specified. For more comprehensive (and disagreeing) treatments of this issue, see Turri (2009) and Glüer and Wikforss (2018). consists of true propositions that support certain (other) propositions by deductively entailing them, by increasing their probability, or by abductively supporting them.…”

Section: Williamson On Scientific Evidence and The E = K Thesismentioning

confidence: 99%

Scientific Evidence and the Internalism–Externalism Distinction

Egeland

2021

Acta Anal

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Considerations of scientific evidence are often thought to provide externalism with the dialectical upper hand in the internalism–externalism debate. How so? A couple of reasons are forthcoming in the literature. (1) Williamson (2000) argues that the E = K thesis (in contrast to internalism) provides the best explanation for the fact that scientists appear to argue from premises about true propositions (or facts) that are common knowledge among the members of the scientific community. (2) Kelly (Philosophy Compass, 3 (5), 933–955, 2008; 2016) argues that only externalism is suited to account for the public character of scientific evidence. In this article, I respond to Williamson and Kelly’s arguments. First, I show that the E = K thesis isn’t supported by the way in which we talk about scientific evidence, and that it is unable to account for facts about what has been regarded as scientific evidence and as justified scientific belief in the history of science. Second, I argue that there are internalist views that can account for the publicity of scientific evidence, and that those views indeed do better in that regard than the (externalist) view proposed by Kelly. The upshot is that considerations of scientific evidence do not favor externalism over internalism.

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“…This is because truth-conduciveness is a contingent empirical relation, and therefore not something that can be known through reflection alone. Moreover, many externalists take it as obvious or extremely plausible that justification is truth-conducive [see, e.g., Alston (1989) and Glüer and Wikforss (2018)]. However, in response, internalists will often point out that our intuitions about Lehrer and Cohen's (1983) New Evil Demon scenario indicate that forming justified beliefs need not be conducive to forming true beliefs.…”

Section: The Accessibility Of Memorial Justificationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Against overconfidence: arguing for the accessibility of memorial justification

Egeland

2020

Synthese

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In this article, I argue that access internalism should replace preservationism, which has been called "a received view" in the epistemology of memory, as the standard position about memorial justification. My strategy for doing so is two-pronged. First, I argue that the considerations which motivate preservationism also support access internalism. Preservationism is mainly motivated by its ability to answer the explanatory challenges posed by the problem of stored belief and the problem of forgotten evidence. However, as I will demonstrate, access internalism also has the resources to provide plausible solutions to those problems. Second, I argue that preservationism faces a couple of problems which access internalism avoids. Doing so, I present a new scenario which, on the one hand, functions as a counterexample to preservationism, and, on the other hand, provides intuitive support for access internalism. Moreover, I also demonstrate how preservationism, in light of recent research in cognitive psychology, is vulnerable to skepticism about memorial justification, whereas access internalism remains unthreatened. Keywords Memory • Memorial justification • Access internalism • Reliabilism • Preservationism 1 Memorial justification Many, if not most, of our beliefs are justified by memory. Consider your belief (whether occurrent or dispositional) that Mercury is the smallest planet in our solar system, that Fermat's Last Theorem has been proved to be true, or that Napoleon lost the battle of Waterloo.

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Reasons for Belief and Normativity

Cited by 31 publications

References 20 publications

Are epistemic reasons normative?

Are epistemic reasons normative?

Scientific Evidence and the Internalism–Externalism Distinction

Against overconfidence: arguing for the accessibility of memorial justification

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