Reassessing Hedging: The Logic of Alignment in East Asia

Explaining Australia–Japan security cooperation and its prospects: ‘the interests that bind?’

“…Australia's behaviour cannot be convincingly explained only by any additional economic benefits closer security relations may bring to the relationship, given Australian angst over relations with China as its major trading partner. It also cannot be accounted for by hedging behaviour given Australia's (and Japan's) unwavering alignment with the USA (Lim & Cooper, 2015;Van Jackson, 2014). The explanation for deeper Australian security engagement with Japan, in the absence of shared BOT perceptions, economic benefit, or hedging incentives, lies instead with the generally unchallenged importance in Australian policy thinking and public opinion of both the ANZUS alliance and the bilateral relationship with Japan to Australia's fundamental and unchanging interest in maintaining the existing liberal-based order-a core specific interest shared with both the USA and Japan.…”

When Hedging Goes Wrong: Lessons from Ukraine’s Failed Hedge of the EU and Russia

“…However, one aspect of smaller power hedging which can be more easily categorised is alignment, namely: what is the underpinning alignment aim for the relatively smaller power engaging the hedge. The underlying alignment aim of a hedging strategy has often been overlooked in the hedging literature, although Lim and Cooper’s (2015, p. 698) definition of hedging as ‘an alignment choice involving the signaling of ambiguity over the extent of shared security interests with great powers’ does hint at the central importance of alignment. This paper, therefore, argues that the underlying alignment aim within the hedging strategy is a crucial factor to the likelihood of a successful hedging strategy.…”

“…The third option is an asymmetrical hedge in which a smaller power nominally (usually with regards security) aligns with one great power but does so in a way that is not exclusive to having relations (usually trade) with the other great power (Lim and Cooper, 2015). This is a less ambitious strategy than dual‐aligned hedging, but it is certainly more ambitious than a non‐aligned hedge as the smaller power is still trying to forge a middle ground whereby it reaps the benefits of alignment with one state but also the benefits of having cordial relations with the other.…”

“…Hedging is an alluring strategy for relatively smaller powers because, on the surface, it appears as an optimal foreign policy grand strategy which enables them to avoid the trade‐offs inherent to either balancing or bandwagoning (Lim and Cooper, 2015). It is argued that while hedging may indeed be an optimal strategy for relatively smaller powers, it is neither costless nor easy to execute, especially if a smaller power is residing in a particularly unstable regional geopolitical environment.…”

Geopolitics, Ethnic Conflicts along the Border, and Chinese Foreign Policy Changes toward Myanmar

“…1 Specifically, how China handles its relations with neighboring states in the region, and how such states respond to China's rise, has come under increasing scrutiny. 2 One such case is China's relations with Myanmar 3 This is the version of the article accepted for publication in Asian Security published by Taylor & Francis: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fasi20 Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: https://eprints.soas.ac.uk/23597/ 2 national interests. By reorienting its foreign relations to balance against China, Myanmar has significantly improved its bargaining position toward China, which manifests in its newfound ability to push back against China's economic and strategic penetration into the country.…”