Reforming Sticky Institutions: Persistence and Change in Turkish Agriculture

Abstract

The recent revival of interest in institutions in development studies favors the analysis of macroinstitutions and questions of institutional origination and change. But a strong emphasis on mid-range, sectoral arrangements, and a refined notion of continuity, can also improve our understanding of institutions in late developers-one by facilitating a thick view of institutions while offering a sharp perspective on the current institutional reform agenda, and the other by casting new light on instances of irregular change and failed or partial reform. The trajectory of Turkey's agricultural support regime is used as a case to substantiate this argument. Building on an analytic distinction between resilience and persistence, the article explains the dynamic continuity of populist-corporatist forms of market governance in Turkish agriculture, despite the neoliberalism of the 1980s and 1990s and radical institutional reform efforts of the 2000s.

A Story of Post‐Fordist Exploitation: Financialization and Small‐Scale Maize Farmers in Turkey

“…In the 1980s, a period plagued by a lack of coordinated policy in agriculture, the annual average of credits given by the public Bank of Agriculture, the largest credit supplier for agricultural production, was $230 million. In the 1990s that increased to $1.6 billion (Güven 2009). The total agricultural credit stock of $3 billion (4 billion liras) in 2003 spiked to $15 billion (23 billion liras) by 2010, when the Bank of Agriculture supplied about 70 percent of credits (Ş engül and Sarıbal 2013;TurkStat 2014b).…”

Rethinking Agricultural Policy in Turkey: International Context and Domestic Developments

“…Consequently, market-oriented large landowners dominated pressure group activity and benefited from the majority of incentives. In contrast, competitive politics and democratic participation perceived distributional aspect as an important policy consideration of development plans (Erguder, 1980;Guven, 2009). In sum, agricultural support policies in Turkey served as political propaganda aimed at small farmers and were adopted for the short-term stability on prices that led to temporary income security rather than fair distribution (Kazgan, 2003).…”

“…Closely linked with the international financial institutions, Dervis facilitated a top-down and rapid restructuring and the managerial team around him gained power and autonomy as well. His role as a policy entrepreneur and mediator provided radical reform initiative a kind of legitimacy that would have been missing otherwise (Guven, 2009;Keyman and Onis, 2007). The Economic Reform Program supervised by Dervis expedited liberalization and the restructuring of agriculture with a special emphasis on subsidies due to the assumption that direct subsidies were a burden on the budget.…”

“…Since they had lost their functions, producers could not meaningfully convey their demands to the political center and follow supervised market operations. As a consequence, ARIP never received palpable societal support and was labeled as a technocratic project imposed from above (Guven, 2009). …”

Agrarian Change under Globalization: Markets and Insecurity in Turkish Agriculture

“…7 7 Direct income support is the per hectare payments at a flat rate to farmers cultivating up to 50 hectares. (This system was widely criticized mainly for favouring the big landholders and not taking into account the land registration problems in the country: see Güven 2009, 179.) Deficiency payments comprise the second largest share (after direct income support) in agricultural subsidies in the 2000s.…”