Reforming the Pension Reforms: The Recent Initiatives and Actions on Pensions in Argentina and Chile

Rofman, Rafael; Fajnzylber, Eduardo; Herrera, Germán

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1992438

Cited by 34 publications

(32 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…However, successive administrations affected the original intent by forcing funds to hold a higher and higher share of public debt, which was affected by the default, and by finally scrapping the system and returning to a public PAYG system (see El Cronista 2009 for a chronology of events). In Chile, a country with higher government capabilities (Scartascini, Stein, and Tommasi, 2008) the outcomes of the reform process have been quite different (Rofman, Fajnzylber and Herrera, 2008). 13 This result is consistent with Keefer's findings that "…financial sector development depends on the willingness of governments to provide public goods" (Keefer 2008, 151).…”

supporting

confidence: 57%

The politics of financial development: The role of interest groups and government capabilities

Becerra

Cavallo

Scartascini

2012

Journal of Banking & Finance

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Documents published in the IDB working paper series are of the highest academic and editorial quality. All have been peer reviewed by recognized experts in their field and professionally edited. The information and opinions presented in these publications are entirely those of the author(s), and no endorsement by the Inter-American Development Bank, its Board of Executive Directors, or the countries they represent is expressed or implied. This paper may be freely reproduced provided credit is given to the Inter-American Development Bank. Terms of use: Documents in Abstract *Although financial development is good for long-term growth, not all countries pursue policies that render full financial development. This paper builds on an extensive political economy literature to construct a theoretical model showing that the intensity of opposition to financial development by incumbents depends on both their degree of credit dependency and the role of governments in credit markets. Empirical evidence for this claim is provided, and the results suggest that lower opposition to financial development leads to an effective increase in credit markets' development only in those countries that have high government capabilities. Moreover, improvements in government capabilities have a significant impact on credit market development only in those countries where credit dependency is high (thus, opposition is low). This paper therefore contributes to this rich literature by providing a unified account of credit market development that includes two of its main determinants, traditionally considered in isolation.JEL classifications: G10, G18, G20, G38, O16, D72

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supporting

confidence: 57%

The politics of financial development: The role of interest groups and government capabilities

Becerra

Cavallo

Scartascini

2012

Journal of Banking & Finance

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“…The commission carried out public hearings over a period of three months, in which a broad range of political and social actors presented their reform proposals. 15 According to Rofman et al (2008) the primary motivation and justification for reform was coverage expansion, which was driven by a number of factors. First, and as mentioned before, it was increasingly becoming clear that due to low and interrupted contribution payments large parts of the population (55 per cent) would neither receive sufficient pensions nor qualify for the state minimum pension guarantee.…”

Section: Chilementioning

confidence: 99%

“…In 2000, a report written by the Ministry of Social Development argued that the most critical problem of the system was declining coverage (Secretaría de la Tercera Edad 2000, cited in Rofman et al 2008). In 2002, the government, through the Social Security Secretary, organized a consultative process with experts, representatives of interest groups and government officials, inviting two missions of the ILO (Mesa-Lago 2009a).…”

Section: Argentinamentioning

confidence: 99%

Reforming Pensions in Developing and Transition Countries

Hujo¹

2014

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“…On the other 37 Providing an additional example, Aggarwal, Espach and Tulchin (2004) hand, Chile is regarded as a case of gradual adjustment following deliberation and consensus building, with progress made in correcting the specific problems posed by the system. Rofman, Fajnzylber and Herrera (2008) provide an interesting contrast between pension policymaking in Argentina and Chile. They claim that "in recent years authorities in both countries coincided on identifying insufficient coverage among the elderly and adequacy of benefits as the most critical problems.…”

Section: Figure 4 Quality Of Policies Across Countriesmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the Institutionalization of Congress(Es) in Latin America and Beyond

2012

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Inter-American Development Bank, its Board of Directors, or the countries they represent. Terms of use: Documents inThe unauthorized commercial use of Bank documents is prohibited and may be punishable under the Bank's policies and/or applicable laws. Copyright ©Inter-American Development Bank. This working paper may be reproduced for any non-commercial purpose. It may also be reproduced in any academic journal indexed by the American Economic Association's EconLit, with previous consent by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), provided that the IDB is credited and that the author(s) receive no income from the publication. Cataloging-in-Publication AbstractThis paper proposes an agenda for the study of the determinants and the processes by which strong policymaking institutions emerge, with emphasis on the most central democratic institution: the legislature. It reviews extant theories of institutionalization, and proposes further ways of specifying and studying the concept. It emphasizes the notion that investments and beliefs are the driving force of Congress institutionalization and of its relevance in the policymaking process. Making use of several indicators of Congress institutionalization, it provides evidence suggesting that Congress institutionalization has an impact on the qualities of public policies and on economic and social development outcomes. It also explores some "constitutional" factors that may promote Congress institutionalization. Given that a central theoretical argument of this paper is that the institutionalization of legislatures is a process that includes various self-reinforcing dynamics, the paper also undertakes the preliminary steps in developing a comparative case study of the evolution of Congress institutionalization in two Latin American countries: Argentina and Chile.JEL Codes: D70, D72, H0

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Reforming the Pension Reforms: The Recent Initiatives and Actions on Pensions in Argentina and Chile

Cited by 34 publications

References 17 publications

The politics of financial development: The role of interest groups and government capabilities

The politics of financial development: The role of interest groups and government capabilities

Reforming Pensions in Developing and Transition Countries

On the Institutionalization of Congress(Es) in Latin America and Beyond

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