Relative – not absolute – judgments of credibility affect susceptibility to misinformation conveyed during discussion

French, Lauren; Garry, Maryanne; Mori, Kazuo

doi:10.1016/j.actpsy.2010.10.009

Cited by 63 publications

(79 citation statements)

References 46 publications

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“…Our present findings extend Allen and Levine's (1971) prior work, by suggesting that the "validity" or perceived expertise of another person may be specific to certain past contexts that define the scope of their relative expertise and in which their social influence over our decision making is heightened (see French et al, 2011, for a similar conclusion). The presence of the baseline differences in accuracy for each image and the manipulation check data suggest that our participants were well aware that their own memory was better for the long-versus short-duration images.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 77%

“…Participants who believed that they had encoded images for less time conformed more to their partner than did participants in the other group, even though participants' recall accuracy was equivalent in both groups. French et al (2011) recently produced evidence of a similar pattern obtained by manipulating participants' beliefs about the relative visual acuity of their partner. Complementing this work in which the relative credibility of participants' partner was manipulated, in a parallel series of studies, it has been shown that increases and decreases in the accuracy of one's own memory can systematically reduce or elevate, respectively, the extent to which one is willing to conform to another person's judgments (e.g., Baron et al, 1996;Roediger et al, 2001; see also Tousignant, Hall, & Loftus, 1986).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 76%

“…Prior work has tended to focus on different aspects of the trade-off, either by manipulating the perceived credibility of another individual's memory, as compared with one's own (e.g., French, Garry, & Mori, 2011;Gabbert, Memon, & Wright, 2007), or by manipulating how well one's own memory is actually operating (e.g., Baron, Vandello, & Brunsman, 1996;Roediger, Meade, & Bergman, 2001). These two approaches have produced complementary findings indicating that we become more reliant on other people's memory when they are perceived as more credible than we are, and also when our own memory begins to function less accurately.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Memory conformity and the perceived accuracy of self versus other

et al. 2011

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Here, we demonstrate that the decision to conform to another person's memory involves a strategic trade-off that balances the accuracy of one's own memory against that of another person. We showed participants three household scenes, one for 30 s, one for 60 s, and one for 120 s. Half were told that they would encode each scene for half as long as their virtual partner, and half were told that they would encode each scene for twice as long as their virtual partner. On a subsequent two-alternative-forced choice (2AFC) memory test, the simulated answer of the partner (accurate, errant, or no response) was shown before participants responded. Conformity to the partner's responses was significantly enhanced for the 30-s versus the 60-and 120-s scenes. This pattern, however, was present only in the group who believed that they had encoded each scene for half as long as their partner, even though the short-duration scene had the lowest baseline 2AFC accuracy in both groups and was also subjectively rated as the least memorable by both groups. Our reliance on other people's memory is therefore dynamically and strategically adjusted according to knowledge of the conditions under which we and other people have acquired different memories.

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 77%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 76%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Memory conformity and the perceived accuracy of self versus other

et al. 2011

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“…Design and procedure The design and procedure was the same as Experiment 1a, except subjects viewed a different video and answered a different set of twenty 2AFC questions (French, Garry, & Mori, 2011). We again arranged questions in the two orders, based on data from an earlier 106 subjects who rated each randomly ordered question for its difficulty.…”

Section: Experiments 1cmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ordered questions bias eyewitnesses and jurors

Michael

Garry

2015

Psychon Bull Rev

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Eyewitnesses play an important role in the justice system. But suggestive questioning can distort eyewitness memory and confidence, and these distorted beliefs influence jurors (Loftus, Learning & Memory, 12, 361-366, 2005; Penrod & Culter, Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 1, 817-845, 1995). Recent research, however, hints that suggestion is not necessary: Simply changing the order of a set of trivia questions altered people's beliefs about their accuracy on those questions (Weinstein & Roediger, Memory & Cognition, 38, 366-376, 2010, Memory & Cognition, 40, 727-735, 2012. We wondered to what degree eyewitnesses' beliefs-and in turn the jurors who evaluate them-would be affected by this simple change to the order in which they answer questions. Across six experiments, we show that the order of questions matters. Eyewitnesses reported higher accuracy and were more confident about their memory when questions seemed initially easy, than when they seemed initially difficult. Moreover, jurors' beliefs about eyewitnesses closely matched those of the eyewitnesses themselves. These findings have implications for eyewitness metacognition and for eyewitness questioning procedures.

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“…Indeed, as Leding (2012) noted, whereas persuasion tactics are not necessary to cause memory distortions or 'false memories', they do invariably seem to make such distortions more likely to happen. Both attitudes and memories, for instance, are changed more readily by credible messengers than by non-credible messengers (Dodd & Bradshaw, 1980;French, Garry, & Mori, 2011;Hovland & Weiss, 1951;Pornpitakpan, 2004), yet these effects diminish over time as memory for the message becomes stronger than memory for its 5 source (Hovland & Weiss, 1951;Underwood & Pezdek, 1998). Both attitudes and memories are often bolstered against change when a warning is provided in advance of an attempt to influence (Gallo, Roberts, & Seamon, 1997;Landau & von Glahn, 2004;Petty & Cacioppo, 1977), but are typically less so when the warning is instead provided afterwards (Gerrie & Garry, 2011;Greene, Flynn, & Loftus, 1982;Kiesler & Kiesler, 1964).…”

Section: A Tale Of Two Literaturesmentioning

confidence: 99%