2013
DOI: 10.3917/reco.643.0457
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Rémunération des dirigeants et risque de fraude d'entreprise

Abstract: Nous étudions la relation d'agence entre actionnaires et dirigeant d'une entreprise lorsqu'une action illégale est possible. Nous caractérisons en particulier la rémunération optimale proposée par la firme et son implication sur les décisions prises par le dirigeant. Ceci nous amène à évaluer si l'emploi de stock-options demeure ou non optimal dans ce contexte. Nous analysons en outre l'impact de ces schémas de rémunérations en termes de politique publique de lutte contre la fraude d'entreprise et nous montron… Show more

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Cited by 5 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…Generally, two conditions are necessary so that the use of stock options is not problematic: first, suspensive clauses are essential to guarantee the efficiency of the contractual relationship; second, public policy must integrate the complex effects that we have highlighted in the dual agency relationship (Fleckinger et al, 2013). The financial crisis from 2007 to 2009 was caused by widespread fraud in the mortgage securitization industry (Fligstein and Rochrkasse, 2016).…”
Section: The Social Necessity Of Fighting Against Fraudmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Generally, two conditions are necessary so that the use of stock options is not problematic: first, suspensive clauses are essential to guarantee the efficiency of the contractual relationship; second, public policy must integrate the complex effects that we have highlighted in the dual agency relationship (Fleckinger et al, 2013). The financial crisis from 2007 to 2009 was caused by widespread fraud in the mortgage securitization industry (Fligstein and Rochrkasse, 2016).…”
Section: The Social Necessity Of Fighting Against Fraudmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…First, further developments on the role of sanctions have highlighted that the difficulty to disincentive cartel-type practices is influenced by the fact that the interests of managers may not be aligned with those of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Recent works on remuneration schemes show that they can generate perverse economic incentives, as well as psychological and social responses that motivate counterproductive behaviors such as fraud (Larkin and Pierce 2016) and anticompetitive practices (Fleckinger et al 2013;Fonseca et al 2022). Second, in addition to the role of incentives and sanctions in cartel-type decisions, previous works have investigated the role of psychological and behavioral factors in explaining such decisions.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/FR/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52006XC0901(01)&from=FR.4 En outre, les procédures civiles se développent en Europe (en 2016, des poursuites civiles ont été engagées consécutivement à la condamnation du cartel des camions, https://www.lesechos.fr/industrie-services/tourismetransport/0302223463710-deja-puni-par-bruxelles-le-cartel-des-camions-fait-face-a-ses-clients-2203783.php). 5 Voir la synthèsede Connor et Lande (2012).6 VoirBuccirossi et Spagnolo (2007) et Fleckinger et al (2013. 7 L'expression « têtes brûlées » a été utilisée dans la littérature sur les cartels dansCombe et Monnier-Schlumberger (2016).…”
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