Cournot competition, Stackelberg, preemption, information value, market risk, C73, D43, D81, D83, L13,

International audienceWe analyze firm research and development investment incentives in a framework in which only one innovation can be undertaken. We assume that the probability of discovering the innovation depends on a parameter that represents the technical difficulty of innovating. We show that patent protection is not always necessary for investments to be made. With patent protection, research and development competition leads to a symmetric equilibrium. Moreover, firms over-invest in marginal innovation but under-invest in difficult innovation, which explains why and how public authorities should intervene to promote specific research in certain economic sectors

In a Hotelling's duopoly with a general transportation cost function, we study competition through catalog: each firm chooses at the same time a price and a location. With simultaneous catalog offer, there is no equilibrium in pure strategies for high valuations of the consumers, while a Stackelberg equilibrium exists under mild conditions. The follower is better off than the leader, whose price is smaller: the location preemption effect is weaker than the price leadership effect. We obtain closed-form solutions for the linear and quadratic costs cases. Using these results, we discuss the nature of competition depending on the relative flexibility of products and prices. * We would like to thank Jean-Pierre Ponssard for detailed comments on an earlier version.

Cournot competition, Stackelberg, Preemption, C72, D43, L11,

Nous étudions la relation d'agence entre actionnaires et dirigeant d'une entreprise lorsqu'une action illégale est possible. Nous caractérisons en particulier la rémunération optimale proposée par la firme et son implication sur les décisions prises par le dirigeant. Ceci nous amène à évaluer si l'emploi de stock-options demeure ou non optimal dans ce contexte. Nous analysons en outre l'impact de ces schémas de rémunérations en termes de politique publique de lutte contre la fraude d'entreprise et nous montrons que le levier de la détection n'est pas interchangeable avec celui des amendes. Enfin, nous mettons en évidence que les acteurs ont des préférences divergentes quant à la politique publique de détection de ces pratiques illicites