Representation of Partisan, Territorial, and Institutional Interests in Second Chambers: Evidence from the German Bundesrat and its Committees

Abstract

Revisiting the longstanding debate on interest representation in federal second chambers, this article investigates the influence of partisanship vis-à-vis territorial and other interests such as institutional concerns on deliberations. We argue that committees as the actual place of policy- and decision-making provide an instructive approach to understand interest representation in second chambers, just as in first chambers. For the empirical part of our study, we focus on the German Bundesrat and its committees. Based on the protocols of their meetings, we developed a new dataset that contains information on more than 51,000 roll call votes, the largest-ever empirical basis to study interest representation and decision-making in the Bundesrat. Above all, we find that partisanship plays a role, yet a minor one. The representatives prioritize individual or joint sub-state interests over their political party affiliations, just like the founding fathers of the Federal Republic have envisaged it in the German constitution.

Achieving cross‐sectoral policy integration in multilevel structures—Loosely coupled coordination of “energy transition” in the German “Bundesrat”

“…To date, sixteen Bundesrat committees exist which mainly mirror the jurisdictions of the respective federal departments. The Länder send one or several coordination officials to the committees who come either from the Land's respective sectoral department, from the head of government's executive office (“state chancellery”), or from the Land representations in Berlin (Finke et al, 2020; Miller & Stecker, 2008; Schrenk, 2010). The committees' main purpose is to exchange information and to coordinate positions concerning “their” sectoral agenda items for the next Bundesrat plenary, resulting in recommendations to the Bundesrat plenary from the sectoral point of view.…”

“…As almost all Länder governments are coalition governments, party organizations form an additional layer of coordination which cross‐cuts the Länder and also policy boundaries, thus is unit and sector spanning. In preparatory party meetings during the third week, (so‐called A, B, and G rounds), flexible adjustments of the Länder positions are negotiated taking into account the vertical conflict dimension with the federal level, sectoral conflict dimensions between institutionalized policy sectors, and horizontal conflicts among the Länder (Finke et al, 2020; Leunig, 2006). Because these negotiations take place on site in Berlin, the Land representations are the main actors.…”

Two steps forward, one step back? Party competition, cooperative federalism, and transport policy reforms in Germany

“…In our case, these preconditions are met. Previous studies have substantiated the influence of political parties on decision-making in the Bundesrat [7,17,18]. Other contributions have investigated the legislative procedures in the Bundesrat, mapping the various opportunities for partisan influence [19,20].…”

“…According to the constitutionally enshrined departmental principle (Ressortprinzip), the ministers are responsible for the Länder positions in "their" committee. In the Environment Committee, for example, the positions of the respective ministers of the environment are crucial for deliberation and decision-making and not those of the entire Länder governments [17]. Regarding the operation of Bundesrat committees, therefore, the functioning of coalition governments in the Länder comes close to the analytical idea of "ministerial dictatorship" [22].…”

“…The internal coordination "is overlapped and partly influenced by the simultaneous cross-state coordination of the parties in Berlin. At the end of the week, remaining conflicts need to be resolved solely at state secretary or cabinet level" [17]. If coalition partners cannot find a common position, the government will abstain from voting, following the so-called "Bundesrat Clause" that is formalized in the coalition agreements [17].…”