Reputation based on punishment rather than generosity allows for evolution of cooperation in sizable groups

Abstract

Citation: dos Santos M., Wedekind C. 2015. Reputation based on punishment rather than generosity allows for evolution of cooperation in sizable groups. Evolution and Human Behavior 36(1): 59-64.The content of this preprint is identical with the published paper except from small edits made at proofs. AbstractCooperation among unrelated individuals can arise if decisions to help others can be based on reputation. While working for dyadic interactions, reputation-use in social dilemmas involving many individuals (e.g. public goods games) becomes increasingly difficult as groups become larger and errors more frequent. Reputation is therefore believed to have played a minor role for the evolution of cooperation in collective action dilemmas such as those faced by early humans. Here, we show in computer simulations that a reputation system based on punitive actions can overcome these problems and, compared to reputation system based on generous actions, (i) is more likely to lead to the evolution of cooperation in sizable groups, (ii) more effectively sustains cooperation within larger groups, and (iii) is more robust to errors in reputation assessment. Punishment and punishment reputation could therefore have played crucial roles in the evolution of cooperation within larger groups of humans.

Who Punishes? The Status of the Punishers Affects the Perceived Success of, and Indirect Benefits From, “Moralistic” Punishment

“…While individuals prefer environments where punishment occurs (Gürerk et al, 2006), and thus might prefer punishers for the protection they afford, it is important that an individual can maintain their behavior (e.g., see dos Santos & Wedekind, 2015;Számadó, 2011). A subordinate may land, physically or metaphorically, a ''lucky punch'' but would be unlikely able to fend off the immediate retaliation or any subsequent feuds (e.g., Nikiforakis & Engelmann, 2011).…”

Punishment: one tool, many uses

“…Under the assumption that punishment involves paying a cost to harm another individual, the higher fitness payoffs that result from the target's increased cooperation offers one plausible mechanism by which such investments can be favoured by selection (Boyd and Richerson 1992;Clutton-Brock and Parker 1995;Raihani et al 2010). Punishers might additionally benefit because their actions are witnessed by other individuals who then behave more cooperatively with the punisher in future (dos Santos et al 2011;dos Santos and Wedekind 2015;Jordan and Rand 2017;Raihani and Bshary 2015b, c). Nevertheless, in laboratory games, humans willingly invest in punishment in scenarios where the act is not observed by others, where the punisher will not interact with the target again in future, and/or where the benefits will be shared by other individuals, including non-punishers.…”

Reputation, Gossip, and Human Cooperation

“…Computer simulations demonstrate that cooperation decreases in larger groups, even when incorporating the effect of cooperative reputation (Dos Santos & Wedekind, ; Suzuki & Akiyama, ). However, reputation based on punishment can sustain cooperation in larger groups, because assessing others' punishment reputation by merely monitoring a few punishers is less error‐prone or cognitively demanding (Dos Santos & Wedekind, ). Importantly, this may not represent real‐life situations, because previous behavioral information of the punishers and the punished (compared to others) is also needed to accurately assess others' punishment reputation.…”