Reputation, Gossip, and Human Cooperation

Wu, Junhui; Balliet, Daniel; Lange, Paul A. M. Van

doi:10.1111/spc3.12255

Cited by 143 publications

(108 citation statements)

References 113 publications

(145 reference statements)

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“…Further, more recent advances on SET find that events that remind individuals of resource scarcity, spur more competitive, self-focused, and thus Market Pricing types of interactions (Roux, Goldsmith, & Bonezzi, 2015). The advent of I-focused interactions is consistent with our finding that the PC disruption stage was followed by a period of relational discord (Equality Matching) in the repair stage, which is consistent with SET's emphasis on the role of competition for status and social recognition through gossip (Blau, 1964;Wu, Balliet, & Van Lange, 2016a). Our findings revealed that social discord was major processes during PC renegotiation/repair, which implies that that, at least in the context of organizational change, the restoration of one's personal PC is inextricably tied to that of others.…”

Section: Dynamic Phase Model Of Psychological Contracting Reflected Isupporting

confidence: 86%

The influence of social interaction on the dynamics of employees’ psychological contracting in digitally transforming organizations

Schaft

Lub

Heijden

et al. 2019

European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology

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This paper takes a process perspective in exploring the influence of social interaction on the dynamics of psychological contracting throughout organizational change. Although social interaction is a key focus in social exchange theory, this aspect is largely overlooked in the current psychological contract literature. In this qualitative study, we adopt a retrospective design, asking change recipients to recollect events over time in the context of digital transformation in Dutch travel organizations. Our data reveal a sequence of different kinds of social interactions over the course of a change process, from collective-focused interactions (i.e., kindness and sharing) in stable contracts to transactional interactions (i.e., "what is in it for me") following psychological contract disruption, to relational interactions (i.e., vigilance about equity in social exchange) in psychological contract repair, and to a final return to resonance and alignment with others and a return to psychological contract maintenance. Our results suggest that social interactions play a more potent role in the dynamics of psychological contracting than is currently recognized in the literature. Finally, we discuss a number of implications for dynamic models of psychological contracting.

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Section: Dynamic Phase Model Of Psychological Contracting Reflected Isupporting

confidence: 86%

The influence of social interaction on the dynamics of employees’ psychological contracting in digitally transforming organizations

Schaft

Lub

Heijden

et al. 2019

European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology

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“…reputational information) could serve as such an IV. Future research might also examine if the effect of partner reputational information on own cooperation (Wu, Balliet, & Van Lange, ) only occurs through expectations of partner cooperation, and then test the mediating effect of expectations on the relation between SVO and cooperation (also including the IV in the model). This approach could address another limitation of the current meta‐analysis: because the meta‐analytic structural equation model was a just identified (saturated) path model, and contained no degrees of freedom, we could not evaluate the model's fit.…”

Section: Limitationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Social Value Orientation, Expectations, and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: A Meta–Analysis

et al. 2018

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Interdependent situations are pervasive in human life. In these situations, it is essential to form expectations about the others' behaviour to adapt one's own behaviour to increase mutual outcomes and avoid exploitation. Social value orientation, which describes the dispositional weights individuals attach to their own and to another person's outcome, predicts these expectations of cooperation in social dilemmas—an interdependent situation involving a conflict of interests. Yet, scientific evidence is inconclusive about the exact differences in expectations between prosocials, individualists, and competitors. The present meta‐analytic results show that, relative to proselfs (individualists and competitors), prosocials expect more cooperation from others in social dilemmas, whereas individualists and competitors do not significantly differ in their expectations. The importance of these expectations in the decision process is further highlighted by the finding that they partially mediate the well‐established relation between social value orientation and cooperative behaviour in social dilemmas. In fact, even proselfs are more likely to cooperate when they expect their partner to cooperate. Copyright © 2018 European Association of Personality Psychology

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“…Our second goal was to replicate the effect of reputation on cooperation (Feinberg et al, 2014;Wu et al, 2016b) and test hypotheses about how reputation fosters cooperation in relatively small and large groups. One perspective predicts that reputation is more effective in larger groups because people prefer the best cooperators as partners, such that larger groups contain more competition for reputation and less chance to be selected as partners (Van Vugt et al, 2007;Barclay, 2013).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Moreover, the theory of competitive altruism posits that people prefer to partner with the best cooperators, who will receive more benefits than less cooperative ones (Barclay and Willer, 2007;Van Vugt et al, 2007). Indeed, prior work reveals that people tend to select and cooperate with partners whose reputation is positive (Capraro et al, 2016), and that reputational cues (e.g., gossip) can effectively promote cooperation (Feinberg et al, 2014; for a review, see Wu et al, 2016b). Thus, we expect more cooperation in a situation with reputation-based partner choice than in an anonymous situation (Hypothesis 2).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperation in Groups of Different Sizes: The Effects of Punishment and Reputation-Based Partner Choice

Balliet

Peperkoorn

et al. 2020

Front. Psychol.

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Reputation and punishment are two distinct mechanisms that facilitate cooperation among strangers. However, empirical research on their effectiveness is mainly limited to relatively small groups and does not address how they enhance cooperation in relatively larger groups. We address this gap in the literature by testing hypotheses from competing perspectives about the extent to which reputation-based partner choice and punishment enhance cooperation in both small and large groups. Prior work recognizes that an increase in group size is accompanied by a change in the incentive structure, which determines whether the temptation (extra benefit for each person from noncooperation over cooperation, regardless of others' choices) or gain (extra benefit for each person from full cooperation over full non-cooperation) remains constant or varies with group size. Thus, we first test how group size affects cooperation when temptation or gain increases with group size (Study 1), and then move on to testing predictions on the effectiveness of reputation and punishment across different group sizes (Study 2). In Study 1 (N = 820), we randomly assigned participants to play an online one-shot public goods game in groups of 4, 20, or 40, while keeping the marginal group return or marginal per capita return fixed across groups, in which case the temptation or gain increased with group size. In Study 2 (N = 1,132), we further compared a public goods situation involving a punishment or reputation mechanism with an anonymous situation across group sizes, while the marginal group return was fixed across groups. Overall, we found that when temptation increased with group size, 20-person groups cooperated significantly less than 4-person groups in one-shot interactions, and that this effect was explained by lower expectation of others' cooperation, less perceived collective efficacy, and greater perceived conflict. However, 40-person and 4-person groups did not vary in one-shot cooperation. Importantly, reputation-based partner choice and punishment invariably promoted one-shot cooperation in groups of different sizes. These findings suggest no simple effect of group size on cooperation and underscore the utility of reputation and punishment in fostering cooperation (at least in one-shot interactions) regardless of the size of groups.

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Reputation, Gossip, and Human Cooperation

Cited by 143 publications

References 113 publications

The influence of social interaction on the dynamics of employees’ psychological contracting in digitally transforming organizations

The influence of social interaction on the dynamics of employees’ psychological contracting in digitally transforming organizations

Social Value Orientation, Expectations, and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: A Meta–Analysis

Cooperation in Groups of Different Sizes: The Effects of Punishment and Reputation-Based Partner Choice

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