Resemblance Nominalism

Rodríguez-Pereyra, Gonzalo

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199243778.001.0001

Cited by 260 publications

(20 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…For more on this view, seeRodriguez-Pereyra (2002).9 SeeArmstrong (1978, p. 17).10 A similar point is made by Armstrong in connection with his critique of Predicate Nominalism. P.X.…”

mentioning

confidence: 84%

“Property Possession as Identity: A Response to Dufour”

Monaghan

2007

Int Ontology Metaphysics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…For more on this view, seeRodriguez-Pereyra (2002).9 SeeArmstrong (1978, p. 17).10 A similar point is made by Armstrong in connection with his critique of Predicate Nominalism. P.X.…”

mentioning

confidence: 84%

“Property Possession as Identity: A Response to Dufour”

Monaghan

2007

Int Ontology Metaphysics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…Strict nominalists such as Rodriguez-Pereyra (2002) deny thaf there are universal properties. Rodriguez-Pereyra calls this type of nominalism 'resemblance nominalism'.…”

Section: L)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Bertrand Russell’s Bundle Theory of Particulars

Maclean¹

2014

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This thesis is an examination of Bertrand Russell's realist 'bundle theory of particulars.' In Russell's earlier work, the need to explain the unity and individuality of objects compelled him to accept particulars as well as universals as ultimate kinds of reality. Neve1theless, in carrying out his efforts to economize his ontology, he discovered he could not reduce properties to particulars, because there are some relations that resist nominalistic explanation, but particulars could be reduced to bundles of qualities. In this thesis, I show that the realist 'bundle theory' not only reduces the kinds of ultimate reality to one, i.e., to universal qualities, but also serves all of the purposes for which bare particulars were originally required. Specifically. I examine what I take to be the major criticisms leveled against the realist 'bundle theory': the problem of individuation, the problem of necessity, and the problem of analyticity. I defend the strength and consistency of Russell's theory and argue that it can answer to the objections. I\I THANK 'Annem', Halide and 'Babam', ismail Ko<;, my parents, who supported me in any way they could. My mom came to visit me three times in the cold Canadian winters just so I could get my thesis work done.Duncan Maclean, my 'friend-for-life', another name for a husband or wife in Turkish, who has always been there for me with his love and support. I especially thank him for creating the ultimate conditions at home for me to finish my thesis in the last month.My dear Professor Nicholas Griffin, who has been a very good supervisor to me. I have learned a lot from his corrections and comments on my work and from our discussions. At times that I was frustrated with my work, it was always my respect for him and the desire not to disappoint him that kept me working.My second reader, Prof. Peter Loptson, who has put a lot of effort into correcting and commenting my drafts. He is a very kind person as well as a very good philosopher.My third reader, Prof. Richard Arthur, who has not only corrected and commented on my drafts, but also been an excellent employer (chair), during most of the time I studied in our department as a PhD student. He is a wise and witty professor.My dear friends, 'Dostum', Ebru Girgin Orhangazili, for her unrelenting, long-distance support that helped me keep afloat on foreign waters.Claudia and Joseph Emerson, for her moral support throughout the years and his technical help with computer issues.Gogo Rashmika Pandya, for her friendship and belief in me and the things I could achieve.Dr. Diane Enns, for her friendship, generosity and guidance. Dr. Brain Garrett, for his comments on one my chapters and his advice about the academic world.Jolen Gallagher, for her friendship, care, and moral support. with special reference to his bundle theory of particulars. My aim is to defend Russell's version of bundle theory from some impo1tant objections. The objections I will deal with in detail are ones that are generally directed against realist bundle theori...

show abstract

“…The theorist of universals, by contrast, maintains that the electron is massy by instantiating a mass universal and that it is charged by instantiating a numerically different charge universal (cf. Rodriguez‐Pereyra 2002, 46–48, on the “Many over One” problem). So when a spatial position exhibits both an absolute value of field strength and a spatial directedness, it would be in the spirit of the theory of universals to analyse this twofold qualitative determination as the instantiation of two different universals.…”

Section: Spatial Directedness Of Intrinsic Vectorial Qualities: Thmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For the different versions of nominalism see Lewis (1983, 14–15). Unfortunately the resemblance nominalist's basic notion of resemblance cannot just be a simple plural concept like “(these things) all perfectly resemble each other in exactly one respect” if she is to solve problems such as the companionship difficulty (the point is Carnap's; see Rodriguez‐Pereyra 2002, ch. 10).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Humean Supervenience, Vectorial Fields, and the Spinning Sphere

Busse

2009

Dialectica

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Resemblance Nominalism

Cited by 260 publications

References 0 publications

“Property Possession as Identity: A Response to Dufour”

“Property Possession as Identity: A Response to Dufour”

Bertrand Russell’s Bundle Theory of Particulars

Humean Supervenience, Vectorial Fields, and the Spinning Sphere

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About