and RISE SICS, SwedenLocation-based Services (LBSs) provide valuable services, with convenient features for mobile users. However, the location and other information disclosed through each query to the LBS erodes user privacy. This is a concern especially because LBS providers can be honest-but-curious, collecting queries and tracking users' whereabouts and infer sensitive user data. This motivated both centralized and decentralized location privacy protection schemes for LBSs: anonymizing and obfuscating LBS queries to not disclose exact information, while still getting useful responses. Decentralized schemes overcome disadvantages of centralized schemes, eliminating anonymizers, and enhancing users' control over sensitive information. However, an insecure decentralized system could create serious risks beyond private information leakage. More so, attacking an improperly designed decentralized LBS privacy protection scheme could be an effective and low-cost step to breach user privacy. We address exactly this problem, by proposing security enhancements for mobile data sharing systems. We protect user privacy while preserving accountability of user activities, leveraging pseudonymous authentication with mainstream cryptography. We show our scheme can be deployed with off-the-shelf devices based on an experimental evaluation of an implementation in a static automotive testbed.Additional Key Words and Phrases: Location privacy, honest-but-curious, pseudonymous authentication
INTRODUCTIONA Location-based Service (LBS) query targets a location/region and expresses one or more specific user interests; the LBS server responds with the most up-to-date relevant information, e.g., the latest menu of a restaurant, movies at a cinema, remaining parking slots at a shopping mall, or traffic conditions in the area. During this process, users' current or future whereabouts and interests are disclosed to the LBS server through their queries. All submitted information is deemed necessary to best serve users, and the LBS server is entrusted with rich data. However, many studies [5,15,62] reveal that service providers can be honest-but-curious, aggressively collecting information to profile users, e.g., identifying home or working places or inferring interests for commercial purposes.LBS privacy is studied extensively. Location k-anonymity [16] ensures that at least k − 1 other users are involved in an obfuscated region, R, used as the querier's location. Therefore, even in the presence of a local observer in R, the query cannot be linked to a certain user; the LBS server only learns the querier is one among k users in R. Protection can be achieved by centralized schemes [16,45,46] that introduce an anonymizer, a proxy between users and the LBS server, which anonymizes user queries before sending them to the LBS server. However, the assumed anonymizer trustworthiness merely "shifts" the trust from the LBS server to the anonymizer, holding rich information the same way that the LBS server would. Simply put, an anonymizer could be it...