Respect as a Moral Emotion: A Phenomenological Approach

Drummond, John J.

doi:10.1007/s10743-006-9001-z

Cited by 51 publications

(20 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…For, such a phenomenological account could specify the interpersonal, affective, and practical contexts in which empathic recognition of others is always embedded, and also account for the empathic grasp of the more complex motivational and rational relations between another's mental and affective states. Furthermore, as Drummond (2006) has elaborated, moral responses to others, and in particular, respect, are rooted in empathy, as only the latter provides the means to recognize the radical otherness of the other-a prerequisite for respect for another person as such. Such "recognition respect" (Darwall 2006) contrasts with sympathetic affective processes (notably sympathy and compassion), which are rooted not in the other's otherness, but rather in their sameness or similarity, and the possibility of persons to communalize an share emotional states or values.…”

Section: Research Background and Future Avenuesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Introduction: Empathy, Shared Emotions, and Social Identity

Szanto

Krueger

2019

Topoi

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Section: Research Background and Future Avenuesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Introduction: Empathy, Shared Emotions, and Social Identity

Szanto

Krueger

2019

Topoi

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“…According to Drummond, if the ethical claim that reaches me from the Other has the authority to call my own pursuits into question, that authority must be grounded in some ontological property that the Other possesses, one that commands respect . Drawing on Darwall's distinction between ‘appraisal respect’ and ‘recognition respect’, Drummond argues that while the latter is not reducible to the former—and so, a person can be entitled to recognition respect even if he or she is not entitled to appraisal respect—'respect for persons as such is nevertheless phenomenologically grounded in respect for meritorious persons’ (: 21). It is respect for the ‘merit’ of a person, then—for a quality in that person that measures up to a morally normative standard—that ultimately grounds a universal obligation.…”

Section: Two Objectionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Why is Ethics First Philosophy? Levinas in Phenomenological Context

Crowell

2012

Eur J Philos

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This paper explores, from a phenomenological perspective, the conditions necessary for the possession of intentional content, i.e., for being intentionally directed toward the world. It argues that Levinas's concept of ethics as first philosophy makes an important contribution to this task. Intentional directedness, as understood here, is normatively structured. Levinas's ‘ethics’ can be understood as a phenomenological account of how our experience of the other subject as another subject takes place in the recognition of the normative force of a command. This supplies a condition that—as the paper shows by examining Husserl and Sartre on how our experience of the Other constitutes an ‘objective’ world—earlier phenomenologists have misunderstood, because they have treated ethical experience as ‘founded’ on a prior theory of representation (‘ontology’ in Levinas's language). Ethics is first philosophy because it is only by acknowledging the command in the ‘face’ of the Other that we can account for the sensitivity to the normative distinctions that structure intentional content. Throughout, the paper shows how Levinas's analyses, in Totality and Infinity, draw upon and develop the analyses of Husserl and Sartre.

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“…Together with Levinas's ethical relation, Husserl's (1913=1989) theory of valuing is important to understanding the axiological complexity of pain and suffering experiences for older adults who are seriously ill. Drummond (2005Drummond ( , 2006Drummond ( , 2008 has explicated Husserl's theory of valuing in moral intentionality and phenomenology as involving a foundational order. In applying this order to the examples under consideration, we see illustratively the various affective moments that are possible in experiences of pain and suffering.…”

Section: Husserl: Valuing Experiences Of Pain and Sufferingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Phenomenology of Pain and Suffering at the End of Life: A Humanistic Perspective in Gerontological Health and Social Work

Morrissey

2011

Journal of Social Work in End-Of-Life & Palliative Care

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In this article, the author examines the phenomenology of pain and suffering and the fundamentally social nature of living with serious illness for older adults at life's end. She focuses on three concerns in gerontological health and social work: developing a phenomenological account of lived experiences of pain and suffering; articulating a humanistic phenomenological perspective on the axiological and ethical dimensions of pain and suffering; and exploring a phenomenological approach to a more humanistic, person-centered social work practice with older adults in end-of-life and palliative care. The contribution that the author makes through this article is in elaborating a humanistic framework for understanding agency, obligation, and ethical choice in end-of-life decision making.

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Respect as a Moral Emotion: A Phenomenological Approach

Cited by 51 publications

References 2 publications

Introduction: Empathy, Shared Emotions, and Social Identity

Introduction: Empathy, Shared Emotions, and Social Identity

Why is Ethics First Philosophy? Levinas in Phenomenological Context

Phenomenology of Pain and Suffering at the End of Life: A Humanistic Perspective in Gerontological Health and Social Work

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