Restricting loans of money to Hong Kong civil servants: social censure or violation of human rights?

Abstract

Obtaining a loan is an individual's private business and such a right should be free from interference. However, if Government officers obtain a loan from undesirable persons, they may be lured into committing an act which they would not otherwise have done but for the favours having been shown by the lenders. Section 3 of Hong Kong's Prevention of Bribery Ordinance attempts to limit such behaviour of Government officers. Since the power of this provision is draconian, it may possibly violate human rights. This paper attempts to use a Social Censure perspective to explain why this provision was put in place in the 1970s and why it was not repealed in the 1990s in line with the rise of human rights standards in Hong Kong. It argues that the then British colonial government used a high-hand legal code to fight against corruption in the civil service to win its legitimacy in face of the rise of Red China in the 1970s. A review of twenty-one Section 3 cases suggests that most of the loans were not distributed for mere friendship but involved a wide range of culpability. Thus the coercion generated by Section 3 was approved by the masses, resulting in the reinforcement of a draconian but efficient legal provision in the service of the colonial administration.

Mainlandization, the ICAC, and the Seriousness Attached by Local Politicians to Corruption in Post-1997 Hong Kong

“…However, the political and economic changes that occurred in Hong Kong immediately before and after 1997 posed significant challenges to the anti-corruption efforts of the ICAC. First, the investigative power of the ICAC was compromised by the introduction of the Bill of Rights in 1992, wherein the excessively tough and draconian investigative power of the ICAC was challenged (Lo & Ngan, 2009;Lo & Yu, 2000). Second, the image of the ICAC has been in decline.…”

“…Most of the anti-corruption studies have focused on the activities of the ICAC since 1974 (the year it was established; Lo, 1993;Yep, 2013), including (a) its anti-corruption programs and three-pronged attack strategy (Lai, 2002;Lo, 1999;Manion, 2004), (b) the reasons behind its successful fight against corruption (Gong & Wang, 2013;Lo, 1993Lo, , 1999Scott & Leung, 2012), and (c) its limitability in other countries (Cheung, 2008a;De Speville, 2010;Heilbrunn, 2004;Manion, 2004;Scott, 2010). Recent studies have focused on the conflict between human rights and the draconian power of the ICAC (Lo, 1999;Lo & Ngan, 2009) and on the conflicts of interest that persist in Hong Kong (Scott & Leung, 2008, 2012. Meanwhile, few studies have focused on how the public has perceived the effectiveness of the ICAC.…”

Youths’ Views on Corruption Control in China

“…The reasons for the ruling group's desire to censure corruption vary in China. The most important one is to win hegemony for the ruling group or political elites (Lo, 1993a;Lo & Ngan, 2009). The interests of the ruling group or political elites are not only reflected in politics and ideologies but also in the assumedas-natural knowledge that appears as common sense.…”