Retaining U.S. Air Force Pilots When the Civilian Demand for Pilots Is Growing

Abstract

Limited Print and Electronic Distribution RightsThis document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest.RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR1455Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication.ISBN: 978-0-8330-9431-5 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2016 RAND CorporationR® is a registered trademark. Cover image courtesy of U.S. Air National Guard; photo by Maj. Dale Greer.iii PrefaceThe research discussed in this report was conducted for a project entitled "Pilot Retention Pay Under New Laws." The purpose of the project was to consider how changes in external demand from airline hiring will affect Air Force pilot retention and provide estimates of how modifications to the aviator retention pay (ARP) and aviator pay (AP) programs will influence Air Force pilot retention. To accomplish this goal, this research reviews earlier studies, considers the supply and compensation of airline pilots, and makes an assessment of the future demand for airline pilots. It extends and estimates RAND's dynamic retention model for Air Force pilots and runs simulations to find the effects of increases in airline pilot pay and hiring on Air Force pilot retention and determine the changes in ARP and AP that could offset those effects. It also simulates the effects of eliminating AP for pilots assigned to non-flying positions. This document should be of interest to those concerned with special and incentive pays in the military, and specifically those interested in the effect of the commercial airline industry on Air Force pilot retention.The research reported here was sponsored by AF/A1P and SAF/MR and conducted within the Manpower, Personnel, and Training Program of Project AIR FORCE. RAND Project AIR FORCERAND Project AIR FORCE (PAF), a division of the RAND Corporation, is the U.S. Air Force's federally funded research and development center for studies and analyses. PAF provides the Air Force with independent analyses of policy alternatives affecting the development, employment, co...

Assessing Retention and Special and Incentive Pays for Army and Navy Commissioned Officers in the Special Operations Forces

“…This chapter presents an overview of the DRM for Navy and Army SOF officers. Our description follows that in a companion report on mental health care providers and draws from our DRM analysis of Air Force pilot retention (Mattock et al, 2016).…”

Supplemental Career Paths for Air Force Pilots: A Warrant Officer Component or an Aviation Technical Track?

“…The DRM has been described in earlier documents, including one pertaining to Air Force pilots (Mattock et al, 2016). Using parameters developed from longitudinal retention data, alternative military and civilian earnings, MAH levels, and other pertinent data, the model can be used to project pilot retention under a variety of assumed conditions.…”

I Hear What You Are Saying: Analysis of USAF Rated Officer Comments from the 2015 Military Career Decisions Survey

“…When they examine different assumptions of the DRM, they find that in order to maintain pilot retention in the USAF, the AvB will need to increase between 54% and 151% in order to be competitive. This suggests the AvB needs to increase to between $38,500 and $62,500 (Mattock, Hosek, Asch, & Karam, 2016).…”

“…pay and bonuses, benefits, and ops temp) , and external employment opportunism (e.g. unemployment rates, and major airline hiring) in relationship to turnover (Gotz & McCall, 1983;Fullerton, 2003;Chaffin, Hamilton, & Czerw, 2008;Asch et al, 2010;Coates, Silvernail, Fulton, & Ivanitskaya, 2010;Gray & Grefer, 2012;Hansen & Moskowitz, 2006;Mattock et al, 2016). Studies also treat the decision to stay and the decision to leave as being affected by the same or similar factors.…”

“…As a result, pay and benefits are universally found to be important factors (Ausink & Wise, 1996;Fullerton, 2003;Hansen & Moskowitz, 2006;Mattock et al, 2016), airline hiring reduces retention in the USAF (Levy, 1995;Fullerton, 2003;McGee, 2015), and retention bonuses motivate service members to stay if set at the correct level (Ausink & Wise, 1996;Fullerton, 2003;Mattock et al, 2016). While some models have tried to overcome rational actor limitation by including a taste for service factors (Mattock et al, 2016), almost all studies make the caveat that it is difficult to untangle the effects of the pecuniary and nonpecuniary aspects of the retention decision. This narrow focus on the rational utility maximizing military member has led to a tendency to overlook difficult to measure factors such as attitudes toward senior leadership, perceptions of missions, deployments or ops tempo (Elliott, Kapur, & Gresenz, 2004).…”