Revelation and the Nature of Colour

Allen, Keith

doi:10.1111/j.1746-8361.2011.01261.x

Cited by 31 publications

(20 citation statements)

References 36 publications

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“…Another likely retort is to say, for instance, that being red is like being funny, and so we should hold that whether something is red is mind-dependent (Cohen 2006a, note 7); but Byrne would say that whether this analogy holds is the very issue under discussion (2006). 4 Although the dogmatic reply is not clearly harmed by the objections just considered, there is a better reason to worry about whether the reply can ultimately succeed that stems from the fact that there seems to be strong empirical support for the claim, call it 'Pervasiveness,' that color contrast effects are pervasive in our environment (Hardin 1988;Thompson 1995;Allen 2011). I must define two more terms.…”

Section: The Dogmatic Replymentioning

confidence: 92%

“…10 However, the view often also builds in at least Objectivism and Realism (Byrne and Hilbert 2007;Allen 2011). There is no reason why there cannot be a primitivism that also builds in Incompatibility.…”

Section: A Novel Ecumenical Replymentioning

confidence: 93%

“…Pervasiveness has strong empirical support (Hardin 1988;Thompson 1995;Allen 2011). So, anyone who wants to uphold Incompatibility and Veridicality has good reason to believe Dependence.…”

Section: A Novel Ecumenical Replymentioning

confidence: 94%

“…If no such properties are actually available, primitivism looks to be the extant Dependence-compatible alternative. Many notable figures think primitivism is the correct view on what the colors are, and so an extrinsic primitivism cannot be discounted prior to further investigation (Allen 2011;Campbell 1993Campbell , 2005Gert 2008;Westphal 2005;Yablo 1995). 12 10 See Allen (2011) for a further discussion on how to understand the idea that colors are sui generis properties.…”

Section: A Novel Ecumenical Replymentioning

confidence: 97%

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An ecumenical response to color contrast cases

Roberts

2016

Synthese

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Intrapersonal variation due to color contrast effects has been used to argue against the following intuitive propositions about the colors: No object can be more than one determinable or determinate color of the same grade all over at the same time (Incompatibility); external objects are actually colored (Realism); and the colors of objects are mind-independent (Objectivism). In this article, I provide a defense of Incompatibility, Realism, and Objectivism from intrapersonal variation arguments that rely on color contrast effects. I provide a novel, ecumenical response to such arguments according to which typical variants are right, and which respects Incompatibility, Realism, and Objectivism, using the thesis that the colors of objects depend on the colors of objects in their surrounds.

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Section: The Dogmatic Replymentioning

confidence: 92%

Section: A Novel Ecumenical Replymentioning

confidence: 93%

“…Pervasiveness has strong empirical support (Hardin 1988;Thompson 1995;Allen 2011). So, anyone who wants to uphold Incompatibility and Veridicality has good reason to believe Dependence.…”

Section: A Novel Ecumenical Replymentioning

confidence: 94%

Section: A Novel Ecumenical Replymentioning

confidence: 97%

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An ecumenical response to color contrast cases

Roberts

2016

Synthese

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“…9 For recent philosophical discussion on this topic, see in particular Hardin (1988Hardin ( , 2008; Byrne & Hilbert (2008);Allen (2011).…”

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confidence: 99%

Is Purple a Red and Blue Chessboard? Brentano on Colour Mixtures

Massin¹,

Hämmerli²

2017

The Monist

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Abstract. Can we maintain that purple seems composed of red and blue without giving up the impenetrability of the red and blue parts that compose it? Brentano thinks we can. Purple, according to him, is a chessboard of red and blue tiles which, although individually too small to be perceived, are together indistinctly perceived within the purple. After a presentation of Brentano's solution, we raise two objections to it. First, Brentano's solution commits him to unperceivable intentional objects (the chessboard's tiles). Second, his chessboard account fails in the end to explain the phenomenal spatial continuity of compound colours. We then sketch an alternative account, which, while holding fast to the phenomenal compoundedness of the purple and to the impenetrability of component colours, avoids introducing inaccessible intentional objects and compromising on the continuity of the purple. According to our proposal, instead of being indistinctly perceived spatial parts of the purple, red and blue are distinctly perceived nonspatial parts of it.Purple contains red and blue, orange contains red and yellow and (albeit more controversially) green contains yellow and blue. "Elementary colours" are colours such as yellow, blue, or red, which are not constituted by other colours but can themselves constitute other colours; "compound colours," by contrast, are colours such as green, purple, or orange, which are constituted by more elementary colours. A compound colour is a colour that consists of a mixture of two or more elementary colours different from itself. This paper aims to present and evaluate Brentano's theory of compound

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Cognitive Science and Metaphysics

Schaffer¹

2016

Goldman and His Critics

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Revelation and the Nature of Colour

Cited by 31 publications

References 36 publications

An ecumenical response to color contrast cases

An ecumenical response to color contrast cases

Is Purple a Red and Blue Chessboard? Brentano on Colour Mixtures

Cognitive Science and Metaphysics

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