Rivalry, Reaction, and Weapons Proliferation: A Time-Series Analysis of Global Arms Transfers

Abstract

This article analyzes the competitive dynamics in global arms transfers from 1951 to 1995. I discuss the enduring forces behind the proliferation of military capability during the Cold War and other historical periods, and then consider the competitive dynamics characteristic of the superpower rivalry itself. The process of military‐technological advance, along with the dynamics of enduring interstate rivalry, lead us to expect certain patterns in quantitative data representing arms‐transfer levels over time. Concepts in time‐series analysis—cointegration and error correction—are helpful for understanding competitive arms‐transfer policies during the Cold War, and I apply the relevant analytical tools to test for the hypothesized patterns in the empirical data. American and Russian, as well as NATO and Warsaw Pact, arms transfers are examined at three levels of regional aggregation: the Third World as a whole, the Middle East security complex, and the Persian Gulf subcomplex. The evidence shows that arms transfers by the Cold War rivals moved together in patterns consistent with competitive policy making in an environment of military‐technological change, and that one or both sides adjusted their supply policies to correct for deviations from a moving equilibrium. This describes an action‐reaction process, but a loosely coupled one deriving from military‐technological uncertainties, the complexities of regional security dynamics, and the multidimensional character of the Cold War competition.

The Persistence of Weapons: Global Evidence

“…In the third strand, linkages between the arms trade and other institutional and macroeconomic factors are oriented toward, inter alia : dependence on arms transfer and conflict in foreign policy (Kinsella ); the U.S. rhetoric against the arms trade in the enhancement of democracy and human rights in developing countries (Blanton ); instruments of repression concerning arms imports and human rights in developing countries (Blanton ); the global arms trade and regional security complexes (Kinsella ); analyses of the evolving structure of the arms trade (Kinsella ); connections between military balances, arms transfers, and interstate relations (Sanjian ); nexuses between U.S. arms transfers, democracy, and human rights (Blanton ); comparative analyses on the effects of U.S. versus Chinese arms transfers (De Soysa and Midford ); insights into associations between international reputation, human rights, and arms exports (Erickson ); geostrategic aims of arms trade and strategic choices between buying versus making weapons (Bağci and Kurç ; Blank and Levitzky ); and finally, chemical weapons use, domestic repressions, and growing tendencies in nuclear weapons delivery systems (Brathwaite ; Wasson and Bluesteen ).…”

Autism in International Relations: A critical assessment of International Relations’ autism metaphors

“…Other scholars incorporate empirical evidence to dismiss other theories for their autism. David Kinsella (2002: 212–213), exploring the dynamics of weapons diffusion and procurement, uses autism as a criticism of theories that do not consider the international competition between great powers in the drive for weapons procurement:Technological advances are not exogenous events that trigger automatic efforts to capture and “weaponize” new technologies. They instead grow out of interactions between and within states that, intentionally or unintentionally, help to shape the general course of technological progress … The Cold War competition was, in a sense, institutionalized in the superpowers’ military research and development centers and arms production establishments.…”

The role and capabilities of major weapon systems transferred between 1950 and 2010: Empirical examinations of an arms transfer data set

“…This article categorizes arms to show that there are important differences that are not accounted for with the traditional SIPRI TIV (for previous use see Kinsella 1994Kinsella , 1998Kinsella , 2002 or the WMEAT measure (for previous use see Blanton 1999Blanton , 2000Blanton , 2005 that quantitative analyses use to measure arms transfers (Moore 2012 is a notable exception). The TIV does not take into account the type of arms transferred, but the aggregate military volume in the form of a dollar amount of all weapon systems transferred.…”