2016
DOI: 10.1049/iet-bmt.2015.0045
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Robust cancellable biometrics scheme based on neural networks

Abstract: Several cancellable biometrics (CBs) techniques have been proposed to protect biometric data and maintain users' privacy. Although such techniques can withstand brute-force and/or pre-image attacks, they are vulnerable to correlation attacks. In this study, the authors propose a novel correlation attack-resistant CBs scheme that is based on a convolution operation and a bidirectional associative memory (BAM) neural network. The proposed scheme utilises BAM to bind biometric templates to random bit-strings in a… Show more

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Cited by 27 publications
(18 citation statements)
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“…Besides accounting for trait variability, data protection methods in biometric systems need to verify three other properties. First, the stored templates need to be easily and effectively cancelable if these become compromised (this property is called cancelability or revokability) [6], [7]. Additionally, the transformation from trait measurements to templates should be as close to irreversible as possible, as it should be impossible or infeasible for attackers to retrieve an approximation of the original trait using a compromised template (non-invertibility property) [4], [5].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Besides accounting for trait variability, data protection methods in biometric systems need to verify three other properties. First, the stored templates need to be easily and effectively cancelable if these become compromised (this property is called cancelability or revokability) [6], [7]. Additionally, the transformation from trait measurements to templates should be as close to irreversible as possible, as it should be impossible or infeasible for attackers to retrieve an approximation of the original trait using a compromised template (non-invertibility property) [4], [5].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…There is a variation for the performance of the applied salting schemes. As shown by the figure, the recognition accuracy of the proposed Bio-GAN outperforms the Biohashing [5], Bloom Filter [7], Bioencoding [3], and Hetro_Convolved [19] schemes. While the best recognition accuracy of the applied salting schemes is achieved by randomized bit sampling [30] followed by Hetro_Xor-ed However, the authentication process of the schemes proposed in the Randomized bit sampling [30] and Hetro_Xor-ed [18] depends on an external token and a stored encrypted key, respectively, which make them vulnerable to the security threats of key-based schemes.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 96%
“…Beyond accounting for natural biometric characteristic variability, biometric data protection methods need to verify template cancelability, non-invertibility, and non-linkability. Cancelability (or revokability) means the templates can be easily and effectively rendered useless if they become compromised, generally through the change of a personal key that is bound with the template [13], [14].…”
Section: Background and Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%