Rule of Democracy and Rule of Law

Ferejohn, John; Pasquino, Pasquale

doi:10.1017/cbo9780511610066.011

Cited by 64 publications

(15 citation statements)

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“…Not only were the majority of judges not appointed by political actors who had been popularly elected themselves but a majority of the judges had been on or affiliated with the nonactivist Supreme Court (Couso and Hilbink 2011). Despite the influence of the Supreme Court, a mixed appointment mechanism where different political (and sometimes nonpolitical) actors are involved in appointing a certain number of judges to the constitutional court is supposed to lead to the selection of judges who are more professional and representative of democratic values (see Ríos-Figueroa 2010;Ferejohn and Pasquino 2003). In other words, this selection mechanism should lead to less polarization on the court than a mechanism where the same appointer or appointers select all judges and the choices turn on who is in power at the time of selection.…”

Section: The Chilean Constitutional Tribunalmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ideological Voting on Chile's Constitutional Tribunal: Dissent Coalitions in the Adjudication of Rights

Carroll¹,

Tiede²

2012

Journal of Human Rights

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Section: The Chilean Constitutional Tribunalmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ideological Voting on Chile's Constitutional Tribunal: Dissent Coalitions in the Adjudication of Rights

Carroll¹,

Tiede²

2012

Journal of Human Rights

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“…The recent expansion of judicial review also has a similar (but more directly policy-related) effect on democracy with judicial independence from the other branches of government (Ferejohn & Pasquino, 2003;Stone Sweet, 2000). According to Hirschl (2000;, for instance, the global trend of strengthened judicial review could reinforce hegemonic capitalists on the basis of neoliberalism while hardly contributing to expansion of the progressive rights for distributive justice.…”

Section: The Judicialization Of Politics and The 'Rule Of Law As A Pmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Discordant Combination of Civil-Law Prosecution System and Presidentialism: A Theoretical Framework

Lee¹

2014

JPL

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Civil-law prosecutors could damage particular politicians' moral foundations with their own timing and extent, manipulating criminal proceedings through their broad power within the centralized criminal procedure. This is why they must be cautiously checked by any other body of government, contrary to their common-law counterparts who exercise limited power because of the decentralized criminal procedure. Fortunately, in most civil-law countries, prosecutors are required to be accountable to democratic bodies, despite the global trend of judicial independence. In several new presidential democracies, however, civil-law prosecutors are often involved in the judicialization of politics through criminal proceedings, despite their accountability to a political branch, unlike in the continental European countries. Why is there such a difference? To answer this question, this article provides an innovative theoretical framework explaining that civil-law prosecutors would be induced to abuse their great power in a partisan position, not under a consensus form of government, but under presidentialism, with the new institutionalist approach. According to this framework, empirical researches will also be encouraged.

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“…Collier & Levitsky, 1997) to the rule of law research agenda. Many scholars only use the radial logic inadvertently, by emphasizing potential tradeoffs between the defining attributes ofthe rule of law (see Barros, 2003;Ferejohn and Pasquino, 2003;Belton, 2005:27). However, an explicit attempt to employ a radial logic has recently been proposed by Lauth and Sehring (2009), who, at the same time, offer the conceptual scaffolding for an appraisal ofthe relationship between rule of law components.…”

Section: Diminished Subtypes Ofthe Rechtsstaatmentioning

confidence: 99%

Sub-components of the Rule of Law: Reassessing the Relevance of Diminished Subtypes

Møller

Skaaning²

2013

Comp Sociol

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The rule of law research agenda is in many ways still in its infancy. This is reflected, inter alia, in the fact that no attempt has been made to investigate the empirical relationship between sub-components of the rule law. In this article, we set out to make such an appraisal. We take our cue from a recent attempt to get at this relationship with a typology of 'defective' subtypes of the rule of law. Insofar as the underlying radial logic characterizes the relationship between constituent units of the rule of law, it would mean that countries tend to be situated in a range of so-called diminished subtypes, i.e., combinations defined by the presence of all attributes save one. The upshot of this is that we cannot simply aggregate the sub-component scores into composite indices. However, our analyses show that the scores on different rule of law attributes are highly correlated and that -if less fine-grained distinctions are used -cases tend to be characterized by either the presence of all attributes, by moderate scores on all attributes, or by severe shortcomings in every regard. These findings can be taken to support, first, that the value of constructing diminished subtypes of the rule of law is limited, and, second, that the creation of composite measures by aggregating across the rule of law subcomponents is not hampered by multidimensionality. At the end of the article, we use the extant literature on democratization and state formation to identify some potential reasons for the high co-variation between rule of law attributes.

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Rule of Democracy and Rule of Law

Cited by 64 publications

References 0 publications

Ideological Voting on Chile's Constitutional Tribunal: Dissent Coalitions in the Adjudication of Rights

Ideological Voting on Chile's Constitutional Tribunal: Dissent Coalitions in the Adjudication of Rights

The Discordant Combination of Civil-Law Prosecution System and Presidentialism: A Theoretical Framework

Sub-components of the Rule of Law: Reassessing the Relevance of Diminished Subtypes

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