Rūpesčio habitus medicinoje: reliacinė bioetikos prielaidų interpretacija

Abstract

Straipsnyje analizuojamos bioetikoje vyraujančio pagarbos asmens autonomijai principo prielaidos. Remiantis antropologų L. Dumont’o ir C. Geertzo darbais parodoma, kaip pagarbos asmens autonomijai principas yra susijęs su vakarietiška, krikščioniška, individualistine asmens samprata bei iš to plaukiančiu racionalumo reikšmės įtvirtinimu informuoto sutikimo koncepte. Taip pat ginama idėja, kad būtina atsižvelgti į rūpesčio etikos, pabrėžiančios emocijų svarbą moralėje ir paremtos reliacinio asmens prielaida, pasiūlytas įžvalgas. Straipsnyje parodoma, kaip rūpesčio etikoje pasiūlyti normatyviniai rūpesčio idealai gali būti pritaikomi bioetiniame kontekste – konceptualizuojant rūpestį medicinos sferoje galima pritaikyti Bourdieu pasiūlytą habitus konceptą ir išryškinti ne tik tarpasmeninių santykių svarbą moraliniam vystymuisi, bet ir įvairias sociokultūrines bei istorines įtakas, lemiančias tam tikrus mūsų elgsenos modelius.

Ecological Citizenship: Habitus of Care in the Public Sphere

“…these two models are often used when considering environmental issues. Environmental philosophers with a liberal bent often point to environmental rights as part of the traditional corpus of rights to argue that an adequate environmental life quality should be guaranteed by law (Hayward 2005;Bell 2005). The republican approach suggests that it is the duty of citizens to address environmental destruction and demand changes that would lead to more sustainable societies (Barry 2008).…”

“…In this respect, Pierre Bourdieu's (1990) notion of habitus helps to clarify this issue by offering a theory that considers tastes, emotions, pre-reflexive knowledge, routines and embodied practices as inseparable from one's disposition. An important insight from cultural theorists, including Bourdieu (1990), was that the knowledge of how to act that we acquire through education and family interaction, is deeply shaped by one's social class position and local values. Bourdieu claims that practices are often reproduced unreflectively: they are inscribed in our bodies through dispositions and, therefore, we rarely question particular ways of acting (Bourdieu 1990: 54).…”

“…In this paper, we will examine these two cases in more detail to show that the ethics of care is either misunderstood by narrowing the scope of care to virtue, or that its potential to offer new insights to the old problems of environmental philosophy has been undervalued. The second part of the paper will develop the concept of habitus of care, which has already been elaborated in the context of medical ethics (Bartkienė et al 2014) and is now applied to the issues of environmental philosophy. We argue that the perspective of the ethics of care broadens the concept of ecological citizenship by, on the one hand, highlighting the rational responsibility to care, and, on the other hand, revealing how affect-based ties to the environment and established habits of caring are cultivated in local communities.…”