Sachpolitik oder Parteipolitik?

Bräuninger, Thomas; Gschwend, Thomas; Shikano, Susumu

doi:10.1007/s11615-010-0011-2

Cited by 22 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 24 publications

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“…The stenographic protocols of the plenary sessions are publicly available, but they do not register the individual voting behavior of the Länder. This only occurs in rare cases when the rollcall votes are requested or obligatory for constitutional amendments [26]. Recently, Länder governments have started to publish their voting behavior online.…”

Section: Tracing Decision-making In the German Bundesratmentioning

confidence: 99%

Two steps forward, one step back? Party competition, cooperative federalism, and transport policy reforms in Germany

Souris

Stecker

Jungjohann³

2023

Energ Sustain Soc

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Background Transport policy has regained political relevance in Germany. The successful realization of the Verkehrswende,—the extensive transition toward sustainable transport and mobility—is central to reaching climate neutrality. In 2020, the Federal Government proposed the reform of two key ordinances that have regulated road traffic so far. The amendment was aimed at implementing several provisions at the expense of car drivers and, at the same time, in favor of cyclists and pedestrians. Due to cooperative federalism, the governments of the 16 constituent units (Länder) had to adopt the amendment in the Bundesrat, Germany’s second chamber. In the legislative process, however, the reform ultimately failed in its original scope. Using it as a particularly instructive case study, we show how and why party competition and cooperative federalism hamper comprehensive transport policy reforms in Germany. Results In the German political system, political interests interact within a complex web of cooperative federalism. To understand partisan encroachment on the federal decision-making processes, this paper uses a process-tracing approach. To investigate decision-making in the Bundesrat and its outcomes, the empirical analysis combines qualitative analyses of several publicly available sources. We can empirically demonstrate that political parties influenced legislative procedures. The reform failed in its original scope because the three political parties with veto power in the Bundesrat insisted on their positions and were not willing to agree on a compromise. Conclusions For the implementation of the Verkehrswende, the German federal system proves to be both a blessing and a curse. On one hand, the institutional design of the Bundesrat constrains extreme positions and helps promote decisions most citizens may agree with. The Länder governments and administrations can also contribute their expertise and local experience to federal legislation via the Bundesrat. On the other hand, veto powers are ubiquitous in the German system of cooperative federalism. Therefore, it is prone to blockades. The actions of the political parties in the Bundesrat have hampered the comprehensive reform of road traffic regulations that was originally envisaged. Policymaking took two steps forward toward implementing the Verkehrswende, only to immediately take one step back again.

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Section: Tracing Decision-making In the German Bundesratmentioning

confidence: 99%

Two steps forward, one step back? Party competition, cooperative federalism, and transport policy reforms in Germany

Souris

Stecker

Jungjohann³

2023

Energ Sustain Soc

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…The stenographic protocols of the plenary sessions are publicly available, but they do not register the individual voting behavior of the Länder. This only occurs in the rare cases when the roll-call votes are requested or obligatory for constitutional amendments (Bräuninger et al 2010). Recently, Länder governments have started to publish their voting behavior online.…”

Section: Tracing Decision-making In the German Bundesratmentioning

confidence: 99%

Two Steps Forwards, One Step Back? Party Competition, Cooperative Federalism, and Transport Policy Reforms in Germany

Souris

Stecker²,

Jungjohann³

2022

Preprint

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Background As part of the Verkehrswende, the extensive transition towards sustainable transport and mobility in Germany, the federal government proposed the reform of two key ordinances to implement provisions at the expense of car drivers and, at the same time, in favor of cycling and walking. Due to cooperative federalism, the Bundesrat as the de facto second chamber had to adopt the reform. In the legislative process, the reform ultimately failed in its original scope. Using it as a particularly instructive case study, we show how and why party competition and cooperative federalism hamper comprehensive transport policy reforms in Germany. Results Based on our process-tracing approach, we find that political parties make use of their power in the Bundesrat to influence legislative procedures in accordance with their agenda. Moreover, the political majority constellations in the Bundesrat hinder major transportation reforms and allow for only incremental steps based on the lowest common denominator among decision-makers. Conclusions The case study provides novel empirical evidence for a ‘traditional’ critique of cooperative federalism in Germany, namely that it is prone to blockades and hence political standstill if partisan encroach on federal decision-making. Transport policy has become re-politicized in German party competition. Compromises on the lowest common denominator thwart major reforms and allow for only incremental change.

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“…Political party coordination in the Bundesrat has mainly been discussed in a vertical direction, with some scholars arguing that the federal state government or opposition parties try to use their majorities in the Bundesrat to support or block legislation and with some scholars assessing whether political party or L€ ander interests prevail (Br€ auninger, Gschwend, and Shikano 2010;Lehmbruch 2000;Leunig and Tr€ ager 2014). In a horizontal direction, it has been observed that the political parties repeatedly meet (in so called A-[Social Democrats], B-[Christian Democrats] and recently also G-[Greens] meetings) 8 to coordinate their positions in the Bundesrat (Schrenk 2010;Leonardy 2002;Auel 2014).…”

Section: Political Party Coordinationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…How do the members of the Bundesrat coordinate with each other? Building on research which shows that the interests of the L€ ander governmental actors play a role in Bundesrat decisions (Leunig and Tr€ ager 2014;Br€ auninger, Gschwend, and Shikano 2010), this article conceptualizes three interest dimensions of sub-state governmental actors, namely sectoral, territorial, and political party dimensions, and analyzes their consequences for the conduct of the coordination process. I then theoretically elaborate and empirically test which of these coordination strategies prevails over the others, thereby also including a time factor.…”

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confidence: 99%

Multidimensional Interests in Horizontal Intergovernmental Coordination: The Case of the German Bundesrat

Hegele

2017

Publius: The Journal of Federalism

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In the German Bundesrat, an arena of horizontal intergovernmental relations, sixteen L€ ander governments composed of approximately 170 governmental departments coordinate and negotiate their positions on federal motions. This article analyzes the coordination process and argues that the interests that the actors pursue, as well as the coordination strategies stemming from these interests, are less clear-cut than commonly assumed. Based on a novel network dataset collected by the author, evidence is found for sectoral, political party, and territorial coordination strategies.The main findings are first, that political party coordination in Germany is more frequent than territorial coordination but performs a structuring instead of a substantial function during the coordination process. Second, sectoral coordination mainly takes place at an early stage of the coordination process and is able to solve a bulk of coordination problems by drawing on expert knowledge.Processes of information exchange and coordination between central governments and sub-state governments are important processes in multilevel polities and determinants of successful multilevel policy-making. These occur not only vertically between the federal government and sub-state governments but also horizontally among sub-states. Poirier, Saunders, and Kincaid (2015, 4) argue that intergovernmental relations (IGR) are "the lifeblood of federalism in practice." This is especially true for cooperative federalism as it exists in the German Federal Republic with its system of joint decision-making (Behnke and Kropp 2016). One arena of intergovernmental relations in Germany is the Bundesrat.The German Bundesrat is the second chamber with territorial representation and an important institution in German politics. Its decisions often trigger or contribute to public discourse, for example, when in 2016 a decision regarding asylum policy and safe countries of origin led to intense public debate. In prior years, the Bundesrat initiated and led prominent attempts to forbid the extreme right party (NPD) or to exclude it from public party financing. Recently, it took a

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Sachpolitik oder Parteipolitik?

Cited by 22 publications

References 24 publications

Two steps forward, one step back? Party competition, cooperative federalism, and transport policy reforms in Germany

Two steps forward, one step back? Party competition, cooperative federalism, and transport policy reforms in Germany

Two Steps Forwards, One Step Back? Party Competition, Cooperative Federalism, and Transport Policy Reforms in Germany

Multidimensional Interests in Horizontal Intergovernmental Coordination: The Case of the German Bundesrat

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