Schlick and Husserl on the Essence of Knowledge

A Priori, Objectivity, and Judgement Crossing the Paths of Kantianism, Phenomenology and Neo-Empiricism: A Tribute to Giulio Preti

“…It is true that, in Schlick as in Husserl, knowing something requires an operation on the level of recognition; but contrary to Schlick, Husserl thinks that recognition implies a reference not only to the concept, but also to an intuitive filling. As Roberta Lanfredini wrote (2003: 50–51), although ‘identification with a sensation of red is not a sufficient condition for the determination of an intuitive act, it is in any case a necessary condition’ for it. One cannot identify a red object without experiencing ‘what it is like’ to see something red (to use an expression of Thomas Nagel).…”

“…One cannot identify a red object without experiencing ‘what it is like’ to see something red (to use an expression of Thomas Nagel). That is why ‘it is possible to distinguish in phenomenological terms the determination or discrimination of a perceptive object (the result of a simple act of perception) from the identification of an object (the result of the conjunction of a meaning act and a perceptive act)’ (2003: 50–51, 49 – cf. Parrini, 2002: ch.…”