Secure EPC Gen2 Compliant Radio Frequency Identification

Abstract

Abstract. The increased functionality of EPC Class1 Gen2 (EPCGen2) is making this standard a de facto specification for inexpensive tags in the RFID industry. Recently three EPCGen2 compliant protocols that address security issues were proposed in the literature. In this paper we analyze these protocols and show that they are not secure and subject to replay/impersonation and statistical analysis attacks. We then propose an EPCGen2 compliant RFID protocol that uses the numbers drawn from synchronized pseudorandom number generators (RNG) to provide secure tag identification and session unlinkability. This protocol is optimistic and its security reduces to the (cryptographic) pseudorandomness of the RNGs supported by EPCGen2.

Improving Automatic Verification of Security Protocols with XOR

“…The reader checks the the correctness of the received message before sending the response. Burmester et al give two attacks on the protocol [22], which both rely on the homomorphic properties of CRC functions.…”

Cryptanalysis of an EPC Class-1 Generation-2 standard compliant authentication protocol

“…The exploitation of this attack can be performed for an indefinite time, as the internal values of the tag tuple (EP C, K Ti (j), N Ti (j)) remain constant during all its life. In [6], a similar attack is suggested but its proof is not included.…”

Lightweight RFID authentication with forward and backward security

“…-A Flyweight RFID protocol that provides mutual authentication with session unlinkability, extending work in [Burmester et al 2009a;Burmester and Munilla 2009] (Section 4). -A tag refreshment mechanism that extends the functionality of the Flyweight protocol to capture forward and backward security (Section 5).…”

“…This extends earlier work in Burmester et al [2009b] to more general functionalities, such as refreshment and backward security, appropriate for lightweight RFID deployments. There is comparatively little work on RFID protocols in this framework (see e.g., Burmester et al [2006aBurmester et al [ , 2006b; van Le et al [2007], Burmester et al [2008aBurmester et al [ , 2008b; Burmester and de Medeiros [2009]; Burmester et al [2009aBurmester et al [ , 2009b). …”