2022
DOI: 10.1109/mdat.2022.3151020
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Secure Interposer-Based Heterogeneous Integration

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Cited by 25 publications
(7 citation statements)
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“…(2) The Concealment of HTs Increases. Chiplet-based SoW poses new challenges to hardware security, as mentioned in [21][22][23][24][25][26], where third-party chiplet suppliers can implant a single HT's trigger logic and payload logic into separate chiplets. When the trigger logic in one chiplet is activated, it triggers the malicious payload logic located in another chiplet through the communication channel between chiplets, as shown in Figure 3.…”
Section: Motivationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…(2) The Concealment of HTs Increases. Chiplet-based SoW poses new challenges to hardware security, as mentioned in [21][22][23][24][25][26], where third-party chiplet suppliers can implant a single HT's trigger logic and payload logic into separate chiplets. When the trigger logic in one chiplet is activated, it triggers the malicious payload logic located in another chiplet through the communication channel between chiplets, as shown in Figure 3.…”
Section: Motivationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Multiple IC chips or chiplets are assembled on an interposer for packaging and to be protected from SC attacks or even physically intrusion attacks. A variety of engineering approaches have been proposed in packaging techniques for security [26][27] [28].…”
Section: Attack Protections -Secure Packagingmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Other hardware security studies related to 2.5D/3D integration primarily focus on supply chain vulnerabilities, such as the presence of malicious chiplets (in the form of both software and hardware Trojans) and IP piracy [ 73 , 74 , 75 , 76 ]. For example, an active interposer in a 2.5D system can be leveraged as a root-of-trust to host a hardware security module and various security features, assuming that the interposer is designed and fabricated by trusted entities [ 77 ]. This approach, however, is highly vulnerable to semi-invasive and invasive physical attacks, since the interposer is relatively accessible to a malicious user who can, potentially, bypass these security features while maintaining the functionality of the chiplets.…”
Section: Covert Channel Attacks In 25d/3d Icsmentioning
confidence: 99%