Selecting for Shame: The Monitoring of Workers’ Rights by the International Labour Organization, 1989 to 2011

Koliev, Faradj; Lebovic, James H.

doi:10.1093/isq/sqy005

Cited by 21 publications

(28 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…The institutional design of the ILO provides a unique opportunity to study the determinants of inter-state shaming in international politics. While lacking traditional sanctioning mechanisms, the ILO’s primary tool for making states comply with adopted conventions relies on the ‘logic of shame’ (Koliev and Lebovic, 2018; Weisband, 2000:648). States that have ratified ILO conventions automatically become subject to assessment by the organization’s supervisory bodies.…”

Section: Inter-state Shaming In the Ilomentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Target states are usually represented by a senior official, such as the Minister of Labor or other state official, and occasionally by heads of state. The particular design of the CAS originates from the motivation to put public pressure on norm-violating states in the absence of other, more traditional, sanction mechanisms (Koliev and Lebovic, 2018). Consequently, it is not surprising that governments have called for the abolishment of this procedure throughout the history of the ILO.…”

Section: Inter-state Shaming In the Ilomentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Similarly, other states from different regions have successfully named and shamed target states into compliance, with or without explicit references to trade and other cooperation benefits (ILO, 2005). The ILO’s and states’ condemnations may also mobilize organizations such as domestic and international labor unions against the target state in order to bring about change (Koliev and Lebovic, 2018; Weisband, 2000). But, while these anecdotal cases underline the important role of inter-state shaming in producing compliance with international labor standards, they also generate questions as to why and when states engage in shaming.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Since naming and shaming puts certain violations on the global agenda, it spurs various actors, such as governments, domestic groups and IOs, to put pressure on target states (Hafner-Burton, 2008; Keck and Sikkink, 1998). This pressure may lead to compliance by triggering both norm-based and instrumental considerations (Keck and Sikkink, 1998:16–17; Koliev and Lebovic, 2018). Recent studies have also shown that shaming may have material consequences in terms of a decrease in economic assistance from foreign governments, or even lead to economic sanctions (Murdie and Peksen, 2013).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Shaming and democracy: Explaining inter-state shaming in international organizations

Koliev

2019

International Political Science Review

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Why do some states name and shame norm-violating states while other states abstain? Inter-state naming and shaming is typically viewed as a political tool to punish adversaries and reward allies. In this study, I propose a regime-type explanation for inter-state shaming in international politics. I pose two interrelated questions. First, are democracies more prone to condemn norm violations than non-democratic countries? Second, are democracies likely to shame each other in cases of norm violations? In search of answers to these questions, I use a unique dataset on inter-state shaming the International Labour Organization (ILO) for the period 1991–2011. In line with my main argument, the results suggest that democracies are more likely than non-democracies to engage in the shaming of norm violators, while providing no evidence for special relations between democracies. In addition, this study unpacks other factors influencing the inter-state shaming. The findings have implications for how we understand state interactions in international politics.

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Section: Inter-state Shaming In the Ilomentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Inter-state Shaming In the Ilomentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Shaming and democracy: Explaining inter-state shaming in international organizations

Koliev

2019

International Political Science Review

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“…For related works, see Franklin (2008), Rejali (2008), Clark (2013), Krain (2012), and Koliev (2018).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Backlash against human rights shaming: emotions in groups

Snyder

2019

Int. Theory

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Human rights advocates continue to use shaming as a central tool despite recognizing its declining effectiveness. Shame is indeed a potent motivator, but its effects are often counterproductive for this purpose. Especially when wielded by cultural outsiders in ways that appear to condemn local social practices, shaming is likely to produce anger, resistance, backlash, and deviance from outgroup norms, or denial and evasion. Shaming can easily be interpreted as a show of contempt, which risks triggering fears for the autonomy and security of the group. In these circumstances, established religious and elite networks can employ traditional normative counter-narratives to recruit a popular base for resistance. If this counter-mobilization becomes entrenched in mass social movements, popular ideology, and enduring institutions, the unintended consequences of shaming may leave human rights advocates farther from their goal.

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Naming and shaming in UN treaty bodies: Individual petitions’ effect on human rights

Schoner

2024

Rev Int Organ

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Can individual participation in international legal institutions affect state behavior? Much of the existing literature believes that international law has a limited effect in the countries where it’s needed the most, especially in the absence of enforcement mechanisms. Focused on repressive regimes, this paper analyzes petitions (complaints) filed by victims of human rights abuse in United Nations human rights treaty bodies. As a form of naming and shaming, I theorize that violation decisions– in which a monitoring body confirms a treaty violation– may improve human rights when paired with civil society organizations that publicize the decisions. Leveraging a new dataset, I find that governments improve respect for the most severe abuses involving bodily harm immediately after violation decisions. In support of the theory, these short-lived effects are driven by petitions where civil society actors are listed as representation. This work improves our understanding of the role of non-state actors in global politics and compliance with international institutions. International organizations can, under certain conditions, provide information on non-compliance that sufficiently pressures governments to change domestic practices and decrease repression.

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Selecting for Shame: The Monitoring of Workers’ Rights by the International Labour Organization, 1989 to 2011

Cited by 21 publications

References 27 publications

Shaming and democracy: Explaining inter-state shaming in international organizations

Shaming and democracy: Explaining inter-state shaming in international organizations

Backlash against human rights shaming: emotions in groups

Naming and shaming in UN treaty bodies: Individual petitions’ effect on human rights

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