Self-Consciousness as the Monitoring of Cognitive States: A Theoretical Perspective

Abstract

Following a review of introspectionist, dualist, and functionalist theories of self-consciousness, a mind-brain monitoring theory is developed. According to monitoring theory, self-consciousness is one's tacit knowledge that one is experiencing sensations: in particular, that one is imaging sensations or that one is perceiving them. Such knowledge is the phenomenal consequence of neurally monitoring whether one's sensations are centrally innervated images or peripherally innervated percepts. As a corollary of the present theory, dream images are interpreted as unmonitored images. Other hallucinations, which also arise in the absence of self-consciousness, are similarly interpreted. As another corollary, “subconscious” percepts are interpreted as unmonitored percepts. Experimental and clinical evidence in support of these and other corollaries is reviewed.

The Effect of Image Vividness on Reality Monitoring

“…According to Kunzendorf's theory of reality testing, the central innervation of normal imagery is neurally registered and tacitly experienced; and paradoxically, the central source of more vivid and percept-like imagery (with greater central innervation) is more easily registered and experienced [4]. Two previous experiments by Kunzendorf confirm that, within subject, normally attended percepts are immediately more discriminable from more percept-like images of greater vividness [5(Experiment 3), 6].…”

“…In recent studies of "reality testing", Kunzendorf has found that normal percepts are more easily discriminated from similar images of perceptual vividness than from similar images of lesser vividness [4][5][6]. However, in previous research on "reality monitoring", Johnson has found that memories of normal perception are more easily confused with detailed memories of similar imagery than with less accurate memories of similar imagery [7].…”

“…Physiologically, more vividly imaged sensations entail greater central innervation [8][9][10][11], and greater central innervation is more easily discriminated from the peripheral innervation of normally perceived sensations [10,11]. Thus psychologically, even though more vividly imaged sensations are introspectively more similar to normally perceived sensations, more vivid images are more quickly discriminated from normal percepts [4][5][6]. The question of current interest is whether more vivid images are, consequently, more indelibly encoded as "centrally innervated" and more accurately remembered as "imaged".…”

Subconscious Percepts as “Unmonitored” Percepts: An Empirical Study

“…Dixon's theory assumes that both attended and unattended stimuli are unconsciously perceived, but that only attended stimuli are subsequently represented as conscious sensations [1,2]. In contrast, Kunzendorf's theory assumes that both attended and unattended stimuli are consciously represented as sensations, but that only attended stimuli are accompanied by the self-awareness that one is perceiving them [3]. An experiment supporting this second theory is described, following the introduction of both approaches.…”

“…Unlike Dixon's theory, Kunzendorf's theories of consciousness [19,20J and self-consciousness [3,20] assume that conscious sensations are necessary for perception, but that self-conscious monitoring of the perceptual state is not necessary. Kunzendorf's theory of consciousness [19-20J , a version of 'mindbrain identity' theory, assumes that conscious sensations are the phenomenal qualities of neural events necessary for perception: in particular, that visual sensations are the phenomenal qualities of retinal events, which are neurologically unique events necessary for the perception of optical structure.…”