Self-deception and the ‘splitting of the ego’

Fingarette, Herbert

doi:10.1017/cbo9780511554636.014

Cited by 10 publications

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“…(Which is why this phenomenon has been called, unhelpfully it seems to me, self-deception.) In contrast to this mother, one can imagine someone, perhaps the boy's father, who sees all of that evidence but discounts it, judging that it is outweighed by evidence 5 Contemporary discussion of self-deception, in the sense in which it involves lying to oneself, traces back to Fingarette (2000), first published in 1969. Adler (2002) argues that incontinent belief is impossible.…”

Section: Self-deception Incontinence Half-beliefmentioning

confidence: 99%

Alienated Belief

Hunter¹

2011

Dialectica

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This paper argues that it is possible to knowingly believe something while judging that one ought not to believe it and (so) viewing the belief as manifesting a sort of failure. I offer examples showing that such ‘alienated belief’ has several potential sources. I contrast alienated belief with self‐deception, incontinent (or akratic) belief and half‐belief. I argue that the possibility of alienated belief is compatible with the so‐called ‘transparency’ of first‐person reflection on belief, and that the descriptive and expressive difficulties it involves stem from well‐understood sources. I conclude by speculating that endorsed belief is in important respects like intentional action. Reflection on the possibility of alienated belief may thus help us to see one respect in which an agent can be responsible for her attitudes.

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Section: Self-deception Incontinence Half-beliefmentioning

confidence: 99%

Alienated Belief

Hunter¹

2011

Dialectica

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“…However, the revenge problem he delineated depends on the problematic assumption that Freud adopted a divided mind approach to apparent self-deception, and it is accordingly misses its target. Drawing on Sartre and on Freud himself, Fingarette ( 1983 ) addresses an objection to Freud’s classical theory of the unconscious which is quite close to the one I frame in that subsection.…”

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confidence: 97%

“… 10 Fingarette ( 1983 ) evokes this problem while discussing divided self interpretations of the Freudian conception of the mind. …”

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confidence: 99%

Have We Vindicated the Motivational Unconscious Yet? A Conceptual Review

Billon¹

2011

Front. Psychology

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Motivationally unconscious (M-unconscious) states are unconscious states that can directly motivate a subject’s behavior and whose unconscious character typically results from a form of repression. The basic argument for M-unconscious states claims that they provide the best explanation for some seemingly non-rational behaviors, like akrasia, impulsivity, or apparent self-deception. This basic argument has been challenged on theoretical, empirical, and conceptual grounds. Drawing on recent works on apparent self-deception and on the “cognitive unconscious” I assess those objections. I argue that (i) even if there is a good theoretical argument for its existence, (ii) most empirical vindications of the M-unconscious miss their target. (iii) As for the conceptual objections, they compel us to modify the classical picture of the M-unconscious. I conclude that M-unconscious states and processes must be affective states and processes that the subject really feels and experiences – and which are in this sense conscious – even though they are not, or not well, cognitively accessible to him. Dual-process psychology and the literature on cold–hot empathy gaps partly support the existence of such M-unconscious states.

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“…The romantic metaphors still express a theme that continues to be familiar today. Most forms of repression function, to a greater or lesser extent, as self‐deceit (Fingarette, 1983). The romantic metaphor provides a measure of self‐deceit for conquerors and invaders.…”

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confidence: 99%

Metaphors and Repression: A Comment on Rank

Billig¹

2010

Political Psychology

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Self-deception and the ‘splitting of the ego’

Cited by 10 publications

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Alienated Belief

Alienated Belief

Have We Vindicated the Motivational Unconscious Yet? A Conceptual Review

Metaphors and Repression: A Comment on Rank

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