Side-channels and eVoting machine security: Identifying vulnerabilities and defining requirements

Abstract

Abstract-Election systems making use of eVoting machines are becoming more prevalent. However, security issues do exist within current products and proposed systems. One of these issues is the occurrence of implementation-specific information leakage, otherwise known as side-channel leakage. These have serious implications for voter secrecy. An attack based on electromagnetic leakage from Nedap voting machines has demonstrated that this type of leakage is a relevant issue within eVoting. Therefore, in this paper we present an analysis showing how common components of eVoting machines may be vulnerable to sidechannel attacks. As side-channel leakage is also not sufficiently addressed in the many available requirement documents for eVoting systems, we also define requirements for side-channels within the scope of eVoting machine security. Our proposal involves the application of the Common Criteria method. These requirements can be integrated into existing or future Protection Profiles and Security Targets for eVoting systems.

A Manipulation Prevention Model for Blockchain-Based E-Voting Systems

“…However, the proposed structures should be carefully examined. Although homomorphic encryption is generally agreed to be secure, for example, in the scheme proposed by Li et al [12] and analysis conducted by Wang et al and Qu et al, weaknesses were also identified [21][22][23]. Fontaine and Galand [24] argue that in general the proposed schemes are not very suitable for every use and their properties should be carefully studied.…”