2001
DOI: 10.1080/09512740010018552
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Silent witness: Australian intelligence and East Timor

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Cited by 13 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…For example, in its conduct of the peace support operation in East Timor in 1999, the Australian Navy needed to build up an accurate picture of what was happening ashore, it had to guard against possible interference from intruding Indonesian submarines and the force commander wanted the landing operation itself to be totally secure against all forms of possible attack or accident. The Australian Navy's high levels of expertise in all these areas, derived from its preparations for high-intensity battle, was consequently critical to the success of the INTERFET operation (Ball 2001;Dickens 2001).…”
Section: Naval Battle and The 21st Centurymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For example, in its conduct of the peace support operation in East Timor in 1999, the Australian Navy needed to build up an accurate picture of what was happening ashore, it had to guard against possible interference from intruding Indonesian submarines and the force commander wanted the landing operation itself to be totally secure against all forms of possible attack or accident. The Australian Navy's high levels of expertise in all these areas, derived from its preparations for high-intensity battle, was consequently critical to the success of the INTERFET operation (Ball 2001;Dickens 2001).…”
Section: Naval Battle and The 21st Centurymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…On the one hand, it continued to pursue its strategic relationship with Indonesia by stalling on full public exposure of the degree of violence and the TNI's involvement in the post-ballot violence. 22 On the other hand, it embarked upon a vigorous diplomatic effort to achieve its (undeclared) human security agenda.…”
Section: Australia's 1999 East Timor Policymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In 1995-98, the Royal Australian Air Force acquired two EP-3C Orion aircraft which had been specially configured for SIGINT operations [28], which were used extensively around Timor in 1999-2000, and which were more recently used in the Persian Gulf in support of Operation Enduring Freedom [29]. The RAAF reportedly also operates a SIGINT-configured C-130 H Hercules aircraft; the Australian Army has a King Air 200 fitted for ELINT operations; and the Navy has a Learjet specially equipped for ELINT and electronic warfare activities [30].…”
Section: Article In Pressmentioning
confidence: 99%