Social Capital and Trust in South-east Asian Cities

Carpenter, Jeffrey P.; Danière, Amrita; Takahashi, Lois M.

doi:10.1080/0042098042000194142

Cited by 79 publications

(66 citation statements)

References 33 publications

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“…Fehr & Gächter [28] have showed in an experimental setting that cooperators experience strong emotions when observing free-riders. Such reactions are often manifested through disapproval towards the defectors, even when it is costly and it does not imply monetary gains for the cooperators (see also [29] for social disapproval in field experiments in Southeast Asia). In the presence of such behavioural drivers, second-order free-riding (i.e.…”

Section: A Model Of Norm-driven Cooperation In the Commons (A) Socialmentioning

confidence: 99%

Robustness of norm-driven cooperation in the commons

2016

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Sustainable use of common-pool resources such as fish, water or forests depends on the cooperation of resource users that restrain their individual extraction to socially optimal levels. Empirical evidence has shown that under certain social and biophysical conditions, self-organized cooperation in the commons can evolve. Global change, however, may drastically alter these conditions. We assess the robustness of cooperation to environmental variability in a stylized model of a community that harvests a shared resource. Community members follow a norm of socially optimal resource extraction, which is enforced through social sanctioning. Our results indicate that both resource abundance and a small increase in resource variability can lead to collapse of cooperation observed in the no-variability case, while either scarcity or large variability have the potential to stabilize it. The combined effects of changes in amount and variability can reinforce or counteract each other depending on their size and the initial level of cooperation in the community. If two socially separate groups are ecologically connected through resource leakage, cooperation in one can destabilize the other. These findings provide insights into possible effects of global change and spatial connectivity, indicating that there is no simple answer as to their effects on cooperation and sustainable resource use.

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Section: A Model Of Norm-driven Cooperation In the Commons (A) Socialmentioning

confidence: 99%

Robustness of norm-driven cooperation in the commons

2016

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“…9 See Masclet et al (2003). Carpenter et al (2004aCarpenter et al ( , 2004b) also find positive effects on contributions based on the display of "unhappy faces". See Noussair and Tucker (2005) for an analysis of the effects of combining monetary and non-monetary sanctions.…”

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confidence: 99%

Ostracism and the Provision of a Public Good - Experimental Evidence

2005

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We analyze the effects of ostracism on cooperation in a linear public good experiment with fixed partner design. Our results show that introducing ostracism increases contribution levels significantly except in first and last periods. Despite reductions in group size due to ostracism, the net effect on earnings is positive. This effect is in contrast to most alternative mechanisms aimed at increasing cooperation rates studied in the literature on public good experiments.

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“…(vi) Interestingly, punishment can also increase cooperation if it is purely symbolic and merely expresses social disapproval, without any material consequences for the punished individual (Masclet et al 2003;Carpenter et al 2004;Noussair & Tucker 2005). This suggests that punishment also triggers feelings of guilt and shame that induce individuals to behave pro-socially (Barr 2001;Fessler & Haley 2003).…”

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confidence: 99%

Reciprocity, culture and human cooperation: previous insights and a new cross-cultural experiment

Gächter

Herrmann

2008

Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B

421

326

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Understanding the proximate and ultimate sources of human cooperation is a fundamental issue in all behavioural sciences. In this paper, we review the experimental evidence on how people solve cooperation problems. Existing studies show without doubt that direct and indirect reciprocity are important determinants of successful cooperation. We also discuss the insights from a large literature on the role of peer punishment in sustaining cooperation. The experiments demonstrate that many people are 'strong reciprocators' who are willing to cooperate and punish others even if there are no gains from future cooperation or any other reputational gains. We document this in new one-shot experiments, which we conducted in four cities in Russia and Switzerland. Our cross-cultural approach allows us furthermore to investigate how the cultural background influences strong reciprocity. Our results show that culture has a strong influence on positive and in especially strong negative reciprocity. In particular, we find large cross-cultural differences in 'antisocial punishment' of pro-social cooperators. Further cross-cultural research and experiments involving different sociodemographic groups document that the antisocial punishment is much more widespread than previously assumed. Understanding antisocial punishment is an important task for future research because antisocial punishment is a strong inhibitor of cooperation.

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Social Capital and Trust in South-east Asian Cities

Cited by 79 publications

References 33 publications

Robustness of norm-driven cooperation in the commons

Robustness of norm-driven cooperation in the commons

Ostracism and the Provision of a Public Good - Experimental Evidence

Reciprocity, culture and human cooperation: previous insights and a new cross-cultural experiment

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