Social Decision Heuristics in the Use of Shared Resources

Allison, Scott T.; Messick, David M.

doi:10.1002/bdm.3960030304

Cited by 228 publications

(143 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…Allison & Messick, 1990; see also Messick, 1993, who talked about the attractiveness of the equal division rule). In situations of asymmetry, however, there may be more (normative) ambiguity on how to distribute outcomes.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A social functional approach to emotions in bargaining: When communicating anger pays and when it backfires.

Dijk

Kleef

Steinel

et al. 2008

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

167

157

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A social functional approach to emotions in bargaining: When communicating anger pays and when it backfires van Dijk, E.; van Kleef, G.A.; Steinel, W.; van Beest, I. General rightsIt is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), other than for strictly personal, individual use, unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons). Disclaimer/Complaints regulationsIf you believe that digital publication of certain material infringes any of your rights or (privacy) interests, please let the Library know, stating your reasons. In case of a legitimate complaint, the Library will make the material inaccessible and/or remove it from the website. Please Ask the Library: http://uba.uva.nl/en/contact, or a letter to: Library of the University of Amsterdam, Secretariat, Singel 425, 1012 WP Amsterdam, The Netherlands. You will be contacted as soon as possible. Of the interpersonal emotions during bargaining, anger has received most attention.The basic question that researchers have addressed is whether anger has disruptive or perhaps positive effects in bargaining (e.g., Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef, De Dreu & Manstead, 2004a, b). The results of these studies provided support for the social functions approach described above. Van Kleef et al. (2004a, b), for example, compared how bargainers reacted to an angry opponent and to a happy opponent. For this purpose, they presented their participants a negotiation task, in which they could make the first offer.Subsequently, their (simulated) opponent made a preprogrammed counteroffer, after which participants made a new offer, and the negotiation process continued. During six rounds of offers and counteroffers, participants received emotional reactions from their opponent.These reactions either signaled that the opponent was angry or happy.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A social functional approach to emotions in bargaining: When communicating anger pays and when it backfires.

Dijk

Kleef

Steinel

et al. 2008

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

167

157

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…In addition to these measures, we examined decisions about two extreme allocations that come closer to revealing motivation: how often Player 2 was willing to let Player 1 take all of the pool (Messick & Allison, 1987) and how often Player 1 decided to make an equal or better allocation to Player 2 (Allison & Messick, 1990). In the first case, the willingness of Player 2 to take an allocation of $0 is noteworthy because it represents an indifference point for personal monetary payoffs (Messick & Allison, 1987).…”

Section: Defining Cooperation In Ultimatum Bargaining Games and Sequementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Similarly, the willingness of Player 1 to make an equal allocation is significant because it represents a balance between concern for self and other. In contrast, making an unequal allocation is more competitive because it increases Player 1' s payoff at the expense of Player 2 (Allison & Messick, 1990). Unfortunately, an equal allocation can also be motivated by strategic considerations (i.e., attempting to increase the probability of completing a deal by taking into account Player 2's likely response), so it is not possible to attribute as generous an intent to Player l's equal allocation as it is to Player 2's acceptance of a zero allocation.…”

Section: Defining Cooperation In Ultimatum Bargaining Games and Sequementioning

confidence: 99%

The claiming effect: Why players are more generous in social dilemmas than in ultimatum games.

Larrick

Blount²

1997

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

144

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The term procedural frames is introduced and defined as different representations of structurally equivalent allocation processes. Study 1 compared 2 well-known games, sequential social dilemmas and ultimatum bargaining, that share the same structure: Player 1 creates an allocation of a resource and Player 2 decides whether to allow it or deny it. Study 1 found that Player 1 made more favorable allocations and Player 2 accepted more unfavorable allocations in a social dilemma frame than in an equivalent ultimatum bargaining frame. Study 2 revealed the critical deterininant was whether Player 2 had to respond to an allocation by accepting or rejecting it (as in the ultimatum game) or by making a claim (as in the social dilemma). Two additional studies explored how these actions are perceived. The inconsistency of behavior across procedural frames raises methodological concerns but illuminates construal processes that guide allocation.Two of the most-studied paradigms in mixed-motive research have been social dilemmas and ultimatum bargaining games (Komorita & Parks, 1995). These allocation procedures differ substantially in how the actions of participants are described. In ultimatum bargaining games, players propose a division of a common resource and accept or reject the proposal; in social dilemmas, players make a claim from a common resource. However, versions of these games have been developed that are structurally equivalent but that appear to induce different rates of cooperation. Players appear to be more generous in sequential social dilemmas than in ultimatum bargaining games. The following research tests the existence of the social dilemma-ultimatum bargaining framing effect. The findings offer insight into a specific bias in bargaining, which we call the claiming effect, as well as the more general role that the subjective interpretation of action plays in allocation decisions.We contributed equally to this research. Some findings reported in Study 1 were initially reviewed in Larrick and Blount (1995).

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“…Establishing that reciprocity can be enacted in absence of advantageous material outcomes does not necessarily rule out the possibility that such behavior is motivated by some other social norms, as a general norm of fairness (Messick & Sentis, 1983), desire for equal outcomes (Van Lange, 1999), or the tendency to share unconditionally what is at stake (Allison & Messick, 1990). After all, if an individual reciprocates her partner, her behavior usually turns out to be also fair and often equitable.…”

Section: Reciprocity As a Social Motivementioning

confidence: 99%

Information seeking and reciprocity: a transformational analysis

Gallucci

Perugini

2003

Euro J Social Psych

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The motivation to reciprocate is analyzed within the framework of interdependence theory, with focus on the process of transformation of situations. A model of transformation is presented for the motivation to reciprocate and hypotheses regarding allocation behavior and information seeking are derived. The hypotheses are tested in two experiments implementing a game where participants allocate payoff to self and other in a sequential way, with one participant able to gather costly information regarding the other's previous behavior. Individual differences in the motivation to reciprocate are assessed with the Personal Norm of Reciprocity questionnaire. Results show that participants with high motivation to reciprocate seek information regarding other's past behavior, and react to this information as the norm of reciprocity prescribes. Participants with low motivation to reciprocate prefer information regarding the future of the interaction (Study 1), or no information (Study 2), and behave in a more selfish way. Results are discussed with respect of (1) the transformation of situation process, (2) the role of reciprocity as an interpersonal motive, and (3) the validity of the individual differences measure. Copyright # 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.In situations of interdependence of outcomes, outcomes are often only one of the many components of the situation. Real-life interactions are characterized by a variety of behavioral and interpersonal options that enrich the interpersonal processes over and above the mere allocation of resources among self and others. People often choose when to interact, with whom, and under what conditions, actively shaping the interpersonal situation and their cognitive representation of it. This variety of decisions social actors encounter has been recently taken into account in research about interdependence of outcomes, as research about social dilemmas with the option to exit or enter a relationship (Orbell & Dawes, 1993;Schuessler, 1989; Stanley, Ashlock, & Tesfation, 1994), select the partner (Yamagishi & Hayashi, 1996), or move to different relationships (Gallucci, Van Lange, & Ouwerkerk, in press) testifies. These lines of research show that individuals actively change the feature of the interdependence situation in order to achieve their interpersonal goals. Following Kelley (1997), there are two main processes whereby actors can achieve their interpersonal goals: (1) by selection of situations; (2) by transformation of situations. The first process can be referred to as locomotion (Van Lange & Visser, 1999), that is, actions taken in order to change the level of interdependence among partners. The second process has been the crucial process assumed by interdependence theory (Kelley & Thibout, 1978), whereby an actor transforms a given situation according to her or his motives, and then acts upon the subjective view the transformation process provides. Whereas much of the research aimed at expanding the interdependence framework has been devoted to the analysis of ...

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Social Decision Heuristics in the Use of Shared Resources

Cited by 228 publications

References 16 publications

A social functional approach to emotions in bargaining: When communicating anger pays and when it backfires.

A social functional approach to emotions in bargaining: When communicating anger pays and when it backfires.

The claiming effect: Why players are more generous in social dilemmas than in ultimatum games.

Information seeking and reciprocity: a transformational analysis

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