Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together

Davis, Paul K.; Cragin, Kim; Noricks, Darcy; Helmus, Todd C.; Paul, Christopher; Berrebi, Claude; Gvineria, Gaga; Egner, Michael; Bahney, Benjamin

doi:10.7249/mg849

Cited by 55 publications

(27 citation statements)

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“…Because coercion involves the application of pressure, I define a campaign as one in which an FTO wages multiple attacks that killed at least one person from the target country for the stated purpose of exacting a strategic concession. The FTO list excludes government campaigns against civilians and groups involved in protracted civil wars of attrition, which are normally regarded as conceptually distinct from terrorist campaigns as traditionally defined (Davis & Cragin, 2009;Noricks, 2009;Schmid & Jongman, 2005). 2 Even the most comprehensive data sets do not purport to contain information on the universe of terrorist groups, which remains unknown because of their clandestine nature (Cordesman, 2001, p. 57;Laqueur, 1977, p. 166;Taylor & Jodice, 1983, p. 181).…”

Section: Testing Terrorism's Political Effectivenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Political Effectiveness of Terrorism Revisited

Abrahms

2012

Comparative Political Studies

126

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Terrorists attack civilians to coerce their governments into making political concessions. Does this strategy work? To empirically assess the effectiveness of terrorism, the author exploits variation in the target selection of 125 violent substate campaigns. The results show that terrorist campaigns against civilian targets are significantly less effective than guerrilla campaigns against military targets at inducing government concessions. The negative political effect of terrorism is evident across logit model specifications after carefully controlling for tactical confounds. Drawing on political psychology, the author concludes with a theory to account for why governments resist compliance when their civilians are targeted.

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Section: Testing Terrorism's Political Effectivenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Political Effectiveness of Terrorism Revisited

Abrahms

2012

Comparative Political Studies

126

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“…As to why this might be the case, Krueger and Maleckova (2003) speculate that "well-educated individuals may participate disproportionately in terrorist groups if they think that they will assume leadership positions if they succeed, or if they identify more strongly with the goals of the terrorist organization than less educated individuals, or if they live in a society where the relative pay advantage of well-educated individuals is greater for participation in terrorist organizations than in the legal sector." Noricks (2009) investigates the validity of many of the alleged root causes of terrorism and finds the only factors "likely to be present, agreed by scholars to be important when present, and amenable to policy influence are grievances and mobilizing structures." As Friedman (2003) states, "The single most underappreciated force in international relations is humiliation."…”

Section: The Nature Of Terrorism and Terroristsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Economics of Terrorism

Intriligator

2010

Economic Inquiry

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"This paper treats terrorism as an" economic phenomenon-"as a way to understand it and to control it. It uses the tools of substitution, innovation, and cycles and concludes by noting the importance of intelligence and that the most valuable approach to defeating terrorism is that of denying resources to the terrorists rather than attempting to protect assets at risk. It notes that we are probably not any safer than before the implementation of the post-9/11 strategies and emphasizes that new initiatives must be undertaken to prevent terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction." Copyright (c) 2010 Western Economic Association International.

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“…Anderson & Bushman, 2002). Noricks et al (2009) found that precursors to terrorism include a belief by the acting group that violence is legitimate, substantial motivations on the part of the acting group, and the presence of social structures that permit terrorist acts. Bartlett, Birdwell, and King (2010) found that those drawn to violent religious radicalism tend to have a shallower understanding of religious tenets than religious radicals who do not engage in violence.…”

Section: Directions For Future Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

Group Marginalization

Betts

Hinsz

2013

Pers Soc Psychol Rev

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An extensive research literature has examined the reactions of individuals facing interpersonal rejection. Small groups can also be rejected, but current research tells us little about the experiences of groups and their members directly. We integrate findings from various literatures to gain insight into shared rejection experiences and their outcomes. Of most practical importance, we argue that groups can be expected to react with more hostility than individuals when rejected. Four existing models that account for how group processes might alter such reactions are examined: a need-threat model, a rejection-identification model, a multimotive model, and a dual attitudes model. Aspects of these models are then integrated into a unifying framework that is useful for understanding hostile reactions to group marginalization. Implications for natural groups such as terrorist cells, school cliques, racial and ethnic minorities, and gangs are discussed.

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Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together

Cited by 55 publications

References 0 publications

The Political Effectiveness of Terrorism Revisited

The Political Effectiveness of Terrorism Revisited

The Economics of Terrorism

Group Marginalization

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