Some Elementary Reflexions on Sense-Perception

Broad, C. D.

doi:10.1017/s0031819100019732

Cited by 21 publications

(14 citation statements)

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“…XII. Hume's claims that there is actually a mistake in common sense concerning the nature of perception, in this he has been followed by only a few other philosophers, see for example, Prichard, 1950 andBroad, 1956.…”

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confidence: 99%

The Transparency of Experience

2002

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Abstract:A common objection to sense-datum theories of perception is that they cannot give an adequate account of the fact that introspection indicates that our sensory experiences are directed on, or are about, the mind-independent entities in the world around us, that our sense experience is transparent to the world. In this paper I argue that the main force of this claim is to point out an explanatory challenge to sensedatum theories. In the first part of the paper I explore the form of explanation that an intentional theory of perception can offer of this fact, and I contrast this with an alternative picture labelled naïve realism which can also accommodate and explain the fact of transparency. In the second part of the paper I explore the connection between sensory experience and sensory imagining, arguing that various features of sensory imagining support the hypothesis that in visualising a tree one imagines seeing a tree. In the final part of the paper I argue that the conclusion concerning sensory imagination presents an explanatory challenge for intentional theories of perception which parallels the challenge to sense-datum theories.How can there be debate about perceptual appearances, about how things seem to one? It is common to think that how things appear to one is something obvious to oneself-or at least that it should be obvious if one is suitably attentive to the question. So, one might ask, how can there be sustained debate about what is obvious? Where there is dispute, one should expect that the issue can be settled immediately by reflection on an appropriate example, or that at least one party to the debate is confused, or that the disputants are talking past each other about different experiences.Nevertheless, there is a long history of sustained disagreement about the nature of appearances. For there are many diverse theories of sense perception which seem to be opposed to each other: some are concerned to show a role for subjective entities or qualities in states of awareness; others are insistent This material has been presented in various forms to seminars in York, Lampeter, University College London, Canterbury, Sheffield, Glasgow, St. Andrew's, Oxford, Cambridge New York, and Nottingham. I am grateful for comments to the audiences on all of these occasions; to Ned Block, Paul Boghossian, Naomi Eilan, Keith Hossack, Jennifer Hornsby, Paul Noordhof, Mark Sainsbury, Scott Sturgeon and Jerry Valberg for extended discussion of these matters; to Tamar Gendler-Szabo, Owen Jones, Alan Millar, David Owens, Tom Pink, Paul Snowdon, Charles Travis, Alan Weir and Tim Williamson for responses and written comments and discussion on multiple drafts. I am grateful to the British Academy for research leave award during which the research for this paper was carried out.

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confidence: 99%

The Transparency of Experience

2002

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“…1 In particular, advocates of non-representational views of perception maintain that the phenomenal character of veridical perception-broadly, "what it is like" (Nagel 1974) for the subject to undergo the relevant experience-is explained by the obtaining of a non-representational psychological relation to external mind-independent objects. This places the resulting views in opposition not only to representational or intentional theories, but also to adverbialism (Ducasse 1942;Chisholm 1957;Tye 1984), sense-datum theory (Broad 1952;Moore 1953), and nonrepresentational qualia or 'mental paint' (Block 1996(Block , 2010 views of perception.…”

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“…sense-datum theory (Moore 1918(Moore , 1926Price 1932;Broad 1952;Russell 1921) or the representative realism of Locke (2008) or Hume (2007). This may be contrasted with direct realist accounts of experience according to which we are directly or immediately aware of external objects rather than via some perceptual intermediary, such as sense-data, ideas or impressions.…”

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Introduction: Perception Without Representation

Locatelli

Wilson

2017

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“…[…] It is a natural, if paradoxical, way of speaking to say that seeing seems to “bring one into direct contact with remote objects” and to reveal their shapes and colours. (Broad, 1952, 32, 33)Mature sensible experience (in general) presents itself as […] an immediate consciousness of the existence of things outside of us. (Strawson, 1979, 97)When someone has a fact made manifest to him, […] the obtaining of the fact is precisely not blankly external to his subjectivity.…”

Section: A Paradoxmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: A Paradoxmentioning

confidence: 99%