Some Problems for Conditionalization and Reflection

Arntzenius, Frank

doi:10.5840/jphil2003100729

Cited by 105 publications

(37 citation statements)

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“…Instead we recommend following the argument where it leads. Certain rational agents 31 For trouble cases for Reflection arising from cognitive mishaps, see Skyrms (1987) and Christensen (1991); for cases involving information loss see Talbott (1991), Elga (2000), and Arntzenius (2003). 32 We are indebted to an anonymous referee for pointing this out.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bayesianism, Infinite Decisions, and Binding

Arntzenius¹

2004

Mind

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bayesianism, Infinite Decisions, and Binding

Arntzenius¹

2004

Mind

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“…Despite the adjustments that I have made above, Reflection* still faces counterexamples-and these are the 'puzzling cases': e.g. the Sleeping Beauty case (Elga 2000), the Cable Guy Paradox (Hajek 2005), 3 and Arntzenius' prisoner cases (Arntzenius 2003). These cases all involve a rational agent who respects his or her future self, and yet does not defer to that future self.…”

Section: Reflection a Rational Agent Defers To His Or Her Future Selfmentioning

confidence: 99%

Deference, respect and intensionality

Mahtani

2016

Philos Stud

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(494): 2015). I argue that these principles are incomplete as they stand. The key point is that deference is an intensional relation, and so whether you are rationally required to defer to a person at a time can depend on how that person and that time are designated. In this paper I suggest a way of completing the Reflection Principle and Group Reflection Principle, and I argue that so completed these principles are plausible. In particular, they do not fall foul

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“…the discussion in Arntzenius (2003). This equation can be simplified considerably by substitution of Beauty's Sunday credences as described above.…”

Section: By (11) Her Monday Credence In Heads Can Only Be 1/2 If Hermentioning

confidence: 99%

The Dynamics of Indexical Belief

Schulz

2010

Erkenn

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Indexical beliefs pose a special problem for standard theories of bayesian updating. Sometimes we are uncertain about our location in time and space. How are we to update our beliefs in situations like these? In a stepwise fashion, I develop a constraint on the dynamics of indexical belief. As an application, the suggested constraint is brought to bear on the Sleeping Beauty problem. The problem becomes worse. In some cases, we cannot keep track of the relevant contextual features. Around midnight on Sunday, I may be unsure whether it is still Sunday or already Monday. As a result, I become uncertain whether I should belief 'Today is Sunday' or 'Today is Monday'. How should our credence evolve when we lose track of our location in time and space? IntroductionThe problem of updating in situations of uncertainty concerning our spatiotemporal location has emerged from the Sleeping Beauty problem (which will be reviewed in section 5). But, as the foregoing considerations indicate, the problem of indexical belief is much more general. In this paper, I develop in a stepwise fashion a general constraint on the dynamics of indexical belief which 1 2 CONTINUITY

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Some Problems for Conditionalization and Reflection

Cited by 105 publications

References 0 publications

Bayesianism, Infinite Decisions, and Binding

Bayesianism, Infinite Decisions, and Binding

Deference, respect and intensionality

The Dynamics of Indexical Belief

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