Sound morality: Irritating and icky noises amplify judgments in divergent moral domains

Seidel, Angelika; Prinz, Jesse

doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2012.11.004

Cited by 59 publications

(54 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…First, moral judgments across putatively distinct domains may derive from distinct affective responses [5–9] (but see 10). As prior work has shown, moral judgments of harm and purity violations are rooted in the emotional responses of anger and disgust, respectively [1,11–13].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Harming Ourselves and Defiling Others: What Determines a Moral Domain?

2013

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Recent work has distinguished “harm” from “purity” violations, but how does an act get classified as belonging to a domain in the first place? We demonstrate the impact of not only the kind of action (e.g., harmful versus impure) but also its target (e.g., oneself versus another). Across two experiments, common signatures of harm and purity tracked with other-directed and self-directed actions, respectively. First, participants judged self-directed acts as primarily impure and other-directed acts as primarily harmful. Second, conservatism predicted harsher judgments of self-directed but not other-directed acts. Third, while participants delivered harsher judgments of intentional versus accidental acts, this effect was smaller for self-directed than other-directed acts. Finally, participants judged self-directed acts more harshly when focusing on the actor’s character versus the action itself; other-directed acts elicited the opposite pattern. These findings suggest that moral domains are defined not only by the kind of action but also by the target of the action.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Harming Ourselves and Defiling Others: What Determines a Moral Domain?

2013

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“…Extensive work linking distinct moral emotions to distinct moral domains reveals that harmful actions elicit anger , whereas purity violations (including “taboo” behaviors related to food and sex) elicit disgust (e.g., Horberg, Oveis, Keltner, & Cohen, ; Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, ; Russell & Giner‐Sorolla, , ; Russell, Piazza, & Giner‐Sorolla, ; but see Salerno & Peter‐Hagene, in press, for evidence on the interactive effect of anger and disgust on moral outrage). For example, in one emotion induction study, anger‐eliciting sounds (“noise music”) led uniquely to harsher moral judgments of harm violations (e.g., “crimes against persons”), whereas disgust‐eliciting sounds (the sound of an emetic event, vomiting) led uniquely to harsher moral judgments of purity violations (e.g., “crimes against nature”; Seidel & Prinz, ). In addition, anger reactions are flexibly influenced by contextual cues and social justifications, whereas disgust reactions are largely immune to these factors (Russell & Giner‐Sorolla, , ; Russell & Giner‐Sorolla, ).…”

Section: Mental States Matter More For Harmful Actions Less For Purimentioning

confidence: 99%

When Mental States Matter, When They Don't, and What That Means for Morality

Young

Tsoi

2013

Social & Personality Psych

106

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Research has shown that moral judgments depend on the capacity to engage in mental state reasoning. In this article, we will first review behavioral and neural evidence for the role of mental states (e.g., people's beliefs, desires, intentions) in judgments of right and wrong. Second, we will consider cases where mental states appear at first to matter less (i.e., when people assign moral blame for accidents and when explicit information about mental states is missing). Third, we will consider cases where mental states, in fact, matter less, specifically, in cases of “purity” violations (e.g., committing incest, consuming taboo foods). We will discuss how and why mental states do not matter equivalently across the multi‐dimensional space of morality. In the fourth section of this article, we will elaborate on the possibility that norms against harmful actions and norms against “impure” actions serve distinct functions – for regulating interpersonal interactions (i.e., harm) versus for protecting the self (i.e., purity). In the fifth and final section, we will speculate on possible differences in how we represent and reason about other people's mental states versus our own beliefs and intentions. In addressing these issues, we aim to provide insight into the complex structure and distinct functions of mental state reasoning and moral cognition. We conclude that mental state reasoning allows us to make sense of other moral agents in order to understand their past actions, to predict their future behavior, and to evaluate them as potential friends or foes.

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“…Así, se ha documentado que la música tiene un efecto en la conducta moral, favoreciendo las respuestas empá-ticas, la pro-sociabilidad y el altruismo (Fukui y Toyoshima, 2014; Kirschner y Tomasello, 2010; Kokal, Engel, Kirschner y Keysers, 2011).Más aun, existe evidencia de que diferentes respuestas afectivas inducidas a través de composiciones musicales influenciaron de forma congruente a los juicios morales (Seidel y Prinz, 2013a, 2013b). …”

Section: Evidencia Empírica Del Modelounclassified

¿Estrellas o constelaciones? Implicaciones de los estudios cognitivos para el modelo dimensional de la emoción

Rosa

Tobón

Noguera

2016

PSYWRIT

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Uno de los principales debates dentro del estudio de la psicología de la emoción concierne a la concepción de las emociones como constructos psicológicos unificados (categoriales/discretos) en contraposición con el enfoque dimensional del episodio emocional. En este marco, el modelo dimensional de Russell (2003) destaca en el panorama académico al constituir una propuesta integradora que da cuenta de una serie de problemas históricos del ámbito de estudio. Con este fin, se realiza una aproximación analítica a dicho modelo y se argumenta su viabilidad. El presente artículo tiene como objetivo revisar la evidencia empírica a favor de cuatro hipótesis que sostiene el modelo dimensional de Russell: (1) Existe una primacía temporal de los afectos básicos frente a los componentes más cognitivos en el desarrollo de la emoción, (2) los cambios afectivos percibidos facilitan la accesibilidad del material hedónicamente congruente, (3) la mente humana puede atribuir erróneamente la experimentación de un determinado core affect al estímulo incorrecto, y (4) la experimentación de los componentes dimensionales facilita la ocurrencia de respuestas cognitivas congruentes. Se concluye que la combinación de componentes dimensionales inespecíficos, tanto de tipo puramente afectivo como de carácter más "cognitivo" constituyen ocasionalmente los prototipos emocionales. En consecuencia, se propone que el modelo dimensional de Russell (2003) constituye una alternativa integradora de gran potencial para abordar el estudio de la naturaleza de la emoción.Palabras Clave: Emoción; Cognición; Core Affect; Modelo Dimensional.One of the main debates in the study of the psychology of emotion concerns the conception of emotions as unified psychological constructs (categorical/discrete) versus the dimensional approach to emotional episodes. In this context, the dimensional model of Russell (2003) stands out as an inclusive framework that takes into account a set of historical problems in this field of study. We analysed the model, discussed its viability, and reviewed the empirical evidence in favour of four hypotheses that underlie Russell's dimensional model: (1) There is a temporary primacy of basic affects versus more cognitive components in the development of an emotion; (2) perceived affective changes facilitate access to hedonically congruent material; (3) the human mind can mistakenly attribute the experience of a specific core affect to the incorrect stimulus; and (4) the experience of the dimensional components facilitates the occurrence of congruent cognitive responses. The combination of nonspecific dimensional components, both purely affective as well as those with more "cognitive" characteristics, can act as prototypical emotions. We conclude that Russell's dimensional model is an integrated alternative to other models with great potential for studying the nature of emotion.

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Sound morality: Irritating and icky noises amplify judgments in divergent moral domains

Cited by 59 publications

References 16 publications

Harming Ourselves and Defiling Others: What Determines a Moral Domain?

Harming Ourselves and Defiling Others: What Determines a Moral Domain?

When Mental States Matter, When They Don't, and What That Means for Morality

¿Estrellas o constelaciones? Implicaciones de los estudios cognitivos para el modelo dimensional de la emoción

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