Spatial games and the maintenance of cooperation in an asymmetric Hawk-Dove game

He, Jun-Zhou; Zhao, Yuhong; Cai, Hengjin; Wang, Ruiwu

doi:10.1007/s11434-013-5810-6

Cited by 10 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 35 publications

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“…In the symmetric equilibrium of the volunteers' dilemma with symmetric costs, each player has an equal probability of cooperation [30] , [41] . However, in real social dilemmas, costs may be asymmetric, and the payoffs might therefore be unequal [24] , [31] , [35] , [51] . The model we have developed is the volunteers' dilemma with one “strong” population/player and N-1 “weak” populations/players.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary Stability in the Asymmetric Volunteer's Dilemma

Wang

2014

PLoS ONE

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It is often assumed that in public goods games, contributors are either strong or weak players and each individual has an equal probability of exhibiting cooperation. It is difficult to explain why the public good is produced by strong individuals in some cooperation systems, and by weak individuals in others. Viewing the asymmetric volunteer's dilemma game as an evolutionary game, we find that whether the strong or the weak players produce the public good depends on the initial condition (i.e., phenotype or initial strategy of individuals). These different evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) associated with different initial conditions, can be interpreted as the production modes of public goods of different cooperation systems. A further analysis revealed that the strong player adopts a pure strategy but mixed strategies for the weak players to produce the public good, and that the probability of volunteering by weak players decreases with increasing group size or decreasing cost-benefit ratio. Our model shows that the defection probability of a “strong” player is greater than the “weak” players in the model of Diekmann (1993). This contradicts Selten's (1980) model that public goods can only be produced by a strong player, is not an evolutionarily stable strategy, and will therefore disappear over evolutionary time. Our public good model with ESS has thus extended previous interpretations that the public good can only be produced by strong players in an asymmetric game.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary Stability in the Asymmetric Volunteer's Dilemma

Wang

2014

PLoS ONE

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“…For reconcile model with the actuality, we assume the position is interchangeablity (Gaunersdorfer et al, 1991) and the asymmetric interaction and symmetric interaction of opponent individuals all exist. Then we develop an asymmetric game with four strategy types for public goods (He et al 2013). Therefore, the two strategies are also present for the two positions in the previous game (see Table 1).…”

Section: Model Assumptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In this study, combining symmetric and asymmetric interaction (He et al, 2013), we developed an asymmetric volunteer's dilemma game with four strategy types by taking into account the assumption that different positions can be interchangeable in role games (Gaunersdorfer et al, 1991). Viewing this asymmetric game as an evolutionary game, we nd that it possesses multiple equilibria which depend on different initial condition.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Polymorphism of Producing Public Goods in an Evolutionary Volunteer's Dilemma Game

Guo

Perc

et al. 2022

Preprint

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There is an inconsistency between theory and observations with regards to the contributions of strong and weak players to the public goods. Theory suggests that contributors are either strong players in asymmetric games or cooperative players in symmetric games, but experiments indicate that the weak players in asymmetric systems also contribute to public goods. To reconciling these conflicts, we here study an evolutionary volunteer's dilemma game by assuming different roles can be interchangeable. In this model, the evolutionary dynamics shows the dynamics of multiple equilibria that depend on initial conditions, which can be interpreted as the production modes of public goods under different circumstances. Precisely, we find that the survival of strong individuals with mixed strategies is associated with two different outcomes. One result is equal to Selten's (1980) model, and public goods are produced by strong players if the defectors are weak players, where strong defectors are scarce in the initial condition. In another result, the weak individuals with mixed strategies produce public goods if the defectors are strong individuals, where the strong cooperators are absent in the initial condition. Concretely, the game degenerates to a mixed population of strong individuals with the weak players going extinct, and the weak defectors are scarce in the initial condition. The studied evolutionary game may help to explain the emergence of diverse forms of cooperation in asymmetric evolutionary games.

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“…There was substantial development in the study of symmetric games [15][16] that helped promote sustainable development and improved the ecological conditions. Besides, there was a lot of application on asymmetric games, such as parasitic relationships 33) , the battle of the sexes 34) , animal conflicts 35) , and social variation [36][37][38][39] . Many researchers had conducted their research and analysis on the behavior of the environment [40][41][42] , pollution [43][44][45] , enterprise [46][47][48][49][50] , cyberspace 51) , water resources management 52,53) , and wind-water system 54) , based on the evolutionary game theory.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary Game Analysis For Sustainable Environment Under Two Power Generation Systems

Habib¹,

Kabir²,

Tanimoto³

2022

Evergreen

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With the rapid prosperity of the global economy and industry, as the energy demand, many factors influence power-producing sectors, including government incentives, customer demand, production cost, eco-friendly, and investors investment. To analyze the cost-benefit-subsidy in power generator system under the evolutionary game setting, we considered two asymmetric game structures by coupling the photovoltaic (PV) power system and coal-fired (CF) power system. To model the asymmetric games for PV and CF, Game-1 considers respective cost and benefit, whereas, Game-2 deliberates cost, benefit, and government subsidy. We present both analytical and numerical approaches within this framework.

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Spatial games and the maintenance of cooperation in an asymmetric Hawk-Dove game

Cited by 10 publications

References 35 publications

Evolutionary Stability in the Asymmetric Volunteer's Dilemma

Evolutionary Stability in the Asymmetric Volunteer's Dilemma

The Polymorphism of Producing Public Goods in an Evolutionary Volunteer's Dilemma Game

Evolutionary Game Analysis For Sustainable Environment Under Two Power Generation Systems

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