Abstract. In this paper, we present some side channel cube attacks on LBlock, a lightweight block cipher proposed at ACNS 2011. It is shown that in the single bit leakage model, 14 bits of the secret key can be recovered with 2 10.7 time and 2 7.6 chosen plaintexts, captured the 44th state bit of the third round. In the Hamming weight leakage model, the full 80-bit key can be retrieved with only 2 10 32-round LBlock encryptions and 211.1 chosen plaintexts, given the leakage of the second least significant bit (LSB) of the Hamming weight after the third round. We also provide a rigorous analysis on the error tolerance probabilities of our attacks and show that the full 80-bit key can be restored in 2 30 32-round LBlock encryptions with 2 8.5 chosen plaintexts and at most 5.5% of the noisy leaked bits in the LSB of the Hamming weight after the second round. Many of the ideas in our attacks are applicable to other block ciphers as well.