State Legislative Election Returns (1967-2010)

Klarner, Carl; Berry, William D.; Carsey, Thomas M.; Jewell, Malcolm E.; Niemi, Richard G.; Powell, Lynda W.; Snyder, James M.

doi:10.3886/icpsr34297

Cited by 74 publications

(85 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…These data are derived from Klarner (2003) for the partisan composition of state governments. Our measure for the partisan election margin is derived from Klarner et al (2013). In a given election year and state, we first sum all of the votes earned by Republican and Democratic candidates and then we take the absolute percentage difference between the two.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Principle or a Strategy? Voter Identification Laws and Partisan Competition in the American States

Hicks

McKee

Sellers

et al. 2014

Political Research Quarterly

117

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We undertake a comprehensive examination of restrictive voter ID legislation in the American states from 2001 through 2012. With a dataset containing approximately one thousand introduced and nearly one hundred adopted voter ID laws, we evaluate the likelihood that a state legislature introduces a restrictive voter ID bill, as well as the likelihood that a state government adopts such a law. Voter ID laws have evolved from a valence issue into a partisan battle, where Republicans defend them as a safeguard against fraud while Democrats indict them as a mechanism of voter suppression. However, voter ID legislation is not uniform across the states; not all Republican-controlled legislatures have pushed for more restrictive voter ID laws. Instead, our findings show it is a combination of partisan control and the electoral context that drives enactment of such measures. While the prevalence of Republican lawmakers strongly and positively influences the adoption of voter ID laws in electorally competitive states, its effect is significantly weaker in electorally uncompetitive states. Republicans preside over an electoral coalition that is declining in size; where elections are competitive, the furtherance of restrictive voter ID laws is a means of maintaining Republican support while curtailing Democratic electoral gains.

show abstract

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Principle or a Strategy? Voter Identification Laws and Partisan Competition in the American States

Hicks

McKee

Sellers

et al. 2014

Political Research Quarterly

117

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…To study the state legislatures, we use the Klarner et al (2013) dataset, which covers all state legislative elections in the years 1968-2010. Among these cases, we focus on general elections that take place in partisan, single-member districts.…”

Section: Data On Us State Legislative Electionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Majority-Party Disadvantage: Revising Theories of Legislative Organization

Feigenbaum

Fouirnaies

Hall

2017

QJPS

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Dominant theories of legislative organization in the U.S. rest on the notion that the majority party arranges legislative matters to enhance its electoral fortunes. Yet, as we demonstrate in this paper, there is little or no short-term electoral advantage for the majority party in U.S. state legislatures, and there is a pronounced downstream majority-party disadvantage. To establish these findings, we propose a technique for aggregating the results of close elections to obtain "as-if" random variation in majority-party status. We argue that the results from this approach are consistent with a phenomenon of inter-temporal balancing, which we link to other forms of partisan balancing in U.S. elections. The paper thus necessitates revisions to our theories of legislative organization, offers new arguments for balancing theories, and lays out an empirical technique for studying the effects of majority-party status in legislative contexts.

show abstract

“…We then aggregate the number of minor-party candidates in each state by the election year. Louisiana is excluded from our dataset because we cannot obtain sufficient information to count the number of minor-party candidates from Klarner et al (2013). To create [Count] it for the gubernatorial elections, we rely on the Gubernatorial Campaign Expenditures Database, compiled by Beyle and Jensen (2013), which contains data of all gubernatorial candidates for general elections during the period of our study.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…When examining the count of minorparty candidates for state house and senate elections, we include the number of contested seats and open seats in election year t of state t in (1) because they should be positively associated with the outcome variables. The data are based on Klarner et al (2013). For the gubernatorial elections, we created an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the election is open, because of the term-limit restriction, and zero otherwise.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The outcome variable, [Count] it , is equal to the total number of thirdparty and independent candidates running for state house, state senate, or gubernatorial elections that occurred between 1980 and 2010. To count the number of candidates for the state house and senate elections, we first identify the total number of all candidates who ran in a district, and who were not affiliated with the Democratic or Republican party, by using the candidate-level database of State Legislative Election Returns, 1967-2010(Klarner et al 2013. 4 Here, we include all minor party candidate labels (for example, Greens, Libertarians, Right to Life, and so on) and independent candidates.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation