2016
DOI: 10.1177/0094582x15616120
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State, State Institutions, and Political Power in Brazil

Abstract: This article reviews the tensions, contradictions and conflicts in the ideologies and institutions of the

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Cited by 60 publications
(28 citation statements)
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“…According to Boito (2016) and Boito and Saad-Filho (2016) the dismantling in the dominant coalition was fundamentally caused by the offensive of the neoliberal forces. Differently from this paper, the authors part from a dominant coalition in which the internal bourgeoise (formed by the domestic productive capitalists and large domestic banks) is the hegemony.…”
Section: Dilma Developmentalist Coalitionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…According to Boito (2016) and Boito and Saad-Filho (2016) the dismantling in the dominant coalition was fundamentally caused by the offensive of the neoliberal forces. Differently from this paper, the authors part from a dominant coalition in which the internal bourgeoise (formed by the domestic productive capitalists and large domestic banks) is the hegemony.…”
Section: Dilma Developmentalist Coalitionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Extremely large capital inflows, coupled with the global commodity boom, provided the material basis for the PT to deepen its accumulation strategy as well as the particular social contract that it had gradually engineered since it came to power in 2003. More precisely, capital inflows helped finance a wide array of policies emblematic of the PT rule, including a minimum wage increase, growth of public sector employment, welfare regime extension, direct income redistribution, expansion of university education and professional schools (notably for racial minorities and the poor), protection of family agriculture, and public housing programmes (Boito and Saad‐Filho, ). Between 2008 and 2013, public health and education, unemployment benefits, old age and disability pensions (Benefício de Prestação Continuada) increased from 0.40 to 0.56 per cent of GDP and conditional cash transfers (Bolsa Família) from 0.30 to 0.45 per cent (Saad‐Filho, ).…”
Section: Post‐crisis Capital Flows and The Management Of Class Relationsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The plan included government purchases, tax cuts on the payroll, investment, and exports and energy subsidies. Those policies were instrumental in temporarily securing the relative support of some sections of the ‘internal bourgeoisie’, which consists of the owners of large firms (across manufacturing, construction and food processing) and small and medium‐sized companies (Boito and Saad‐Filho, : 192).…”
Section: Post‐crisis Capital Flows and The Management Of Class Relationsmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Though belonging to different political and ideological currents, these parties can nevertheless be categorized as political representatives of neoliberal populist projects. These projects can be identified by three main characteristics: a different development strategy that opens up new accumulation spaces for capital while not entirely at odds with neoliberal prescriptions; a new social policy agenda targeting those disadvantaged segments of the population that have been hitherto excluded from welfare services; and a close and unmediated relationship between a large electoral mass and its political leader (Boito and Saad‐Filho, ; Phongpaichit and Baker, , ).…”
Section: The Key To Understanding the Akp: Neoliberal Populismmentioning
confidence: 99%