Stealthy Adversaries Against Uncertain Cyber-Physical Systems: Threat of Robust Zero-Dynamics Attack

Park, Gyunghoon; Lee, Chanhwa; Shim, Hyungbo; Eun, Yongsoon; Johansson, Karl Henrik

doi:10.1109/tac.2019.2903429

Cited by 86 publications

(29 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…Researchers are studying different aspects of securing the CPS against attacks on the physical layer. The primary research problems are the study of different attack strategies [8], [9], attack resilient state estimation [10]- [12], attack detection strategies [1], [3], [13]- [19], etc. In one approach of attack detection schemes, physical watermarking signals are added to the control inputs and the authenticity of the received observations is checked by various statistical tests.…”

Section: A Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Quickest Detection of Deception Attacks on Cyber-Physical Systems with a Parsimonious Watermarking Policy

Naha¹,

Teixeira²,

Åhlén³

et al. 2022

Preprint

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The addition of a physical watermarking signal to the control input increases the detection probability of data deception attacks at the expense of increased control cost. In this paper, we propose a parsimonious policy to reduce the average number of watermarking events when the attack is not present, which in turn reduces the control cost. We model the system as a stochastic optimal control problem and apply the dynamic programming to minimize the average detection delay (ADD) for fixed upper bounds on false alarm rate (FAR) and increased control cost. The optimal solution results in a two threshold policy on the posterior probability of attack, which is derived from the Shiryaev statistics for sequential change detection assuming the change point is a random variable with a geometric distribution. We derive approximate expressions of ADD and FAR applying the non-linear renewal theory. The relationship between the average number of watermarking added before the attack and the increase in control cost is also derived. We design the optimal watermarking that maximizes the Kullback-Leibler divergence for a fixed increase in the control cost. Simulation studies are performed to illustrate and validate the theoretical results.

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Section: A Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Quickest Detection of Deception Attacks on Cyber-Physical Systems with a Parsimonious Watermarking Policy

Naha¹,

Teixeira²,

Åhlén³

et al. 2022

Preprint

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“…The ZDA and PDA are typical system-theoretic stealthy cyber-physical attacks that corrupt control-related information in communication channels [11], [12]. These uni-directional attacks are relatively simple to implement in comparison to other attacks that invade both channels of the feedback control loop while maintaining their stealthiness.…”

Section: B Stealthy Attacks On Cpsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Although the state of the physical system x(k) diverges to infinity by ( 9), the residualr(k) does not exceed the threshold δ. In consequence, the attack alarm Γ(k) is not raised, which indicates that the PDA guarantees stealthiness from (11).…”

Section: Stealthiness Of the Pole-dynamics Attackmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Stealthy Sensor Attack Detection and Real-Time Performance Recovery for Resilient CPS

Kim

Eun

Park

2021

IEEE Trans. Ind. Inf.

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Cyber-physical attacks exploit intrinsic natures of physical systems and can severely damage cyber-physical systems (CPSs) without being detected by the conventional anomaly detector. In this paper, based on software-defined networking, we propose a holistic resilient CPS framework that can detect, isolate, and recover from cyber-physical attacks in real-time. To show the effectiveness of the proposed framework, we focus on the pole-dynamics attack (PDA), a newly reported stealthy sensor attack that can make the physical system unstable. We develop an efficient detection algorithm for PDA and embed it into the proposed framework. By implementing a testbed, we validate that the proposed framework guarantees resilience of CPS against the PDA.

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“…Assume that the attacker who has taken control of the network line knows the model information of the system and can add the attack signal a k to the controller output, as shown in Figure 4. Then, using the system model, the attacker can generate a sophisticated attack signal that enables the discrete-time output signal to pretend that the system is operating normally but make the internal state actually unbounded [51,52]. The mathematical explanation for the zero-dynamics attack is as follows: From (8), the dynamics of the wind turbine under ZDA becomes…”

Section: Zero-dynamics Attack On Wind Turbinementioning

confidence: 99%

Zero-Dynamics Attack on Wind Turbines and Countermeasures Using Generalized Hold and Generalized Sampler

2021

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Most wind turbines are monitored and controlled by supervisory control and data acquisition systems that involve remote communication through networks. Despite the flexibility and efficiency that network-based monitoring and control systems bring, these systems are often threatened by cyberattacks. Among the various kinds of cyberattacks, some exploit the system dynamics so that the attack cannot be detected by monitoring system output, the zero-dynamics attack is one of them. This paper confirms that the zero-dynamics attack is fatal to wind turbines and the attack can cause system breakdown. In order to protect the system, we present two defense strategies using a generalized hold and a generalized sampler. These methods have the advantage that the zeros can be placed so that the zero dynamics of the system become stable; as a consequence, the zero-dynamics attack is neutralized. The effects of the countermeasures are validated through numerical simulations and the comparative discussion between two methods is provided.

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Stealthy Adversaries Against Uncertain Cyber-Physical Systems: Threat of Robust Zero-Dynamics Attack

Cited by 86 publications

References 29 publications

Quickest Detection of Deception Attacks on Cyber-Physical Systems with a Parsimonious Watermarking Policy

Quickest Detection of Deception Attacks on Cyber-Physical Systems with a Parsimonious Watermarking Policy

Stealthy Sensor Attack Detection and Real-Time Performance Recovery for Resilient CPS

Zero-Dynamics Attack on Wind Turbines and Countermeasures Using Generalized Hold and Generalized Sampler

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